KPFK? Sunny said e-mails asked.
I listened, I just had other things to focus on.
Monday on Connect the Dots with Lila Garrett (KPFK), the one time sitcom writer returned to her show and explained she'd had a serious health crisis in the midst of an interview with Marcy Winograd.
It's a shame she didn't take it as a sign from on high.
Instead, she was interviewing Marcy.
Listening, I grasped why Marcy always loses and how her cult does her no good.
This is Marcy's third attempt to send Jane Harman packing.
If she fails, it will be her third failed attempt.
She can't grasp why that is.
Her cult can't grasp why that is.
They want to blame Henry Waxman -- and some sad types are echoing that -- for calling her out. I know Waxman loosely. If we met today, we'd nod hello but neither would cross the room to a table. If we were seated at the same table, we would speak.
So it's not a friendship or anything like that.
That's my disclosure.
Waxman objected to Marcy's language on Israel and stated she would not be good for Jews in Israel. If some whiner wants to send me his exact words, I'll quote them.
But Marcy and Lila were shocked, SHOCKED!!!!
As is the cult.
There's nothing shocking about it.
Marcy's words are shocking to most people and that's why she loses.
Is she wrong?
I personally do not believe she is.
But I roomed with Rebecca (and with C.I.) in college and the rights of the Palestinians was Rebecca's personal issue.
The Third Estate Sunday Review's Jim, Dona, Ty, Jess, and Ava,
Rebecca of Sex and Politics and Screeds and Attitude,
Betty of Thomas Friedman Is a Great Man,
C.I. of The Common Ills and The Third Estate Sunday Review,
Kat of Kat's Korner (of The Common Ills),
Cedric of Cedric's Big Mix,
Mike of Mikey Likes It!,
Elaine of Like Maria Said Paz),
Trina of Trina's Kitchen,
Ruth of Ruth's Report,
Wally of The Daily Jot,
Marcia of SICKOFITRDLZ,
Stan of Oh Boy It Never Ends,
Isaiah of The World Today Just Nuts
and Ann of Ann's Mega Dub.
That's community links so I don't have to insert links to Rebecca and C.I.
I'm not shocked by Marcy's words.
I don't disagree with her.
But I've heard it all from Rebecca for years and years.
Most people haven't. Most people do not listen to KPFK and if every KPFK listener votes for Marcy (they won't), it wouldn't be enough to get her into office.
She needs to tone down her rhetoric. I'm not saying she needs to believe differently. I'm not saying she needs to trick or fool anyone. I'm saying that most people in this country have never considered the rights of Palestinians or the issues effecting them. It's stupid to blame that on "the Israeli lobby" (which only makes you sound loony). Most Americans don't know very much about any countries.
So she needs to find a way to speak in a less alarming manner. That's especially true of the district she's trying to be elected from.
I personally believe Henry Waxman's conclusions in the letter quoted on air during the broadcast were wrong; however, I do understand why he came to that conclusion and he's not insane for making it. He's not 'low' or 'disgusting' or anything like that. Marcy needs to grasp that the whole country isn't KPFK.
She also needs to realize that she goes over the top on this issue many times. (She and Lila Garrett worked very hard on Monday to stay within the bounds where Marcy provides information and not alienation.)
I think I'll cover the second segment tomorrow. I'm tired tonight.
"Iraq snapshot" (The Common Ills):
Tuesday, January 12, 2009. Chaos and violence continue, Alastair Campbell appears before the Iraq Inquiry and makes clear that neither activists nor US service members matter to him, Campbell's testimony is judged "lies, damned lies," another government find the Iraq War to be an illegal war, and more.
"Today, we are moving on to hear from Ministers and the most senior decision-makers over the next four weeks," chair John Chilcot declared in London. "We will then take a break over the period of the general election, before resuming public hearings in the summer." Chilcot is the chair of Iraq Inquiry and Tony Blair's spokesperson Alastair Campbell (link goes to video and transcript options) was today's witnesses and the press -- the world press with the exception of the US -- has turned out. In the US, George W. Bush sold the illegal war on a number of false claims. In England, then-Prime Minister Tony Blair used the lie that Iraq could attack England with WMD within 45 minutes. It was a lie, the Iraq Inquiry (chaired by John Chilcot) has established that. Tony Blair will appear before them in the near future and, at that time presumably, he will explain whether or not he learned before the start of the war that his claim was false. What is known is that his staff was informed, days before the start of the Iraq War, that his claim was false and, if procedure was followed, that fact should have reached Blair. Along with Blair, current Prime Minister Gordon Brown is expected to testify. Among the commentaries on Campbell's testimony today, the most interesting is probably that of Ibrahim al-Marashi. He wrote the 'intel' for the Iraq War. He wrote it for his PhD and the British government stole it without attribution (as did Collie Powell who used it in his UN 'testimony' before the start of the Iraq War). al-Marashi writes in the Times of London:
What actually happened was this: the British Government took my material, then added pages that argued for military action against Iraq and changed key words to suggest that Iraq had supported al-Qaeda. This formed part of what became known as the "Dodgy Dossier", published in February 2003.
It followed a report released in September 2002, detailing Iraq's WMD programme and including the 45-minute figure four times. The BBC's assertion that Mr Campbell had inserted the 45-minute figure to "sex up" the document led to it being known as the "Sexed-up Dossier".
Sir John Scarlett, the intelligence chief, told the Chilcot inquiry that some of the facts he presented to the Government were "lost in translation". I would say that what got lost in translation is that governments have been spinning wars since the US Government set up the Creel Commission in the First World War.
John Scarlett, in the lead up to the Iraq War, was the chair of Tony Blair's Joint Intelligence Committee. He's already appeared before the committee. We'll note this section from today's hearing.
Committee Lawrence Freedman: On 5 and 9 September you chaired two meetings in the Cabinet Office with senior officials, including John Scarlett, to discuss the dossier. Why were you chairing these meetings?
Alastair Campbell: Because John Scarlett, having done what he considered to be a pretty advanced draft of the dossier, then said to me, I think quite rightly, "It is going to be a document the Prime Minister presents to Parliament. There are massive global expectations around it and I need a bit of presentational support," and that's what I gave him.
Committee Member Lawrence Freedman: Can I just clairfy something you said there? You said Scarlett had already done a draft. I didn't think a draft had been done.
Alastair Campbell: There came a point where he said, "I have now reached a point where I need presentational advice on this". So we met on the 5th and the 9th. As a result of those meetings, a process was set out by me, in writing, around the system, which made clear what the dossier, in terms of its overall structure and contents, was going to be, but also emphasising to everybody within the system that this was now John Scarlett's work and anything that had gone before was redundant and irrelevant. Then, when he came back to me, it was to say, "I have now reached a position where I need presentational advice". I was chairing those meetings because the Prime Minister was going to be presenting the paper that John Was working on to Parliament, massive media interest right around the world, and I think it was entirely, not just appropriate, it was absolutely necessary that I should have done that.
Committee Member Lawrence Freedman: But in most organisations chairing a meeting confers authority and accountability. So basically you are saying you are a customer of this process as well as giving help with the presentation.
Alastair Campbell: I mean, look, in terms of the -- just as a point of accuracy by the way, the meetings were in Downing Street, not the Cabinet Office. Look, within the context of that meeting, I was the person who was charged by the Prime Minister to advise him on all the presentational aspects to do with the dossier, and indeed its production, which was going to be enormous. I think on the day that the dossier was published, the website sort of crashed and the interest was absolutely huge. So John's role within that, which was clearly understood by everybody -- and I think also in a way it hopefully was of assistance to John Scarlett and the JIC, that, in a sense, we were so clearly having that relationship, because to the rest of government it was sending very, very clearly the message: this is now the document that the Prime Minister is going to present to Parliament and that guy over there, John Scarlett, is the man in charge of it.
David Brown (Times of London) reports, "He rejected Sir John's evidence to the inquiry that he could not have altered Mr Balir's foreword -- in which he claimed that the intelligence showed 'beyond doubt' that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- as it was a political statement" and quotes Campbell stating, "If John Scarlett or any of his team had had any concerns of real substance about the foreword then they know they could have raised those directly with the Prime Minister."
Campbell was an ass throughout. He whined like a baby about the BBC and claimed it turned on Blair & Company and wouldn't report any good news from Iraq. He was and remains in a bubble, completely untouched by reality.
Committee Member Roderic Lyne: You have expressed today your support for the policy that was followed on Iraq with very great conviction. Do you consider now that it has been a success and, looking back on it, what lessons would you draw from it beyond the points that have already been made, for example, just now, about the aftermath, and what regrets, if any, do you have?
Alastair Campbell: Do I support it? Yes. I think that, as I said to you just before the break -- I think that Britain, far from beating ourselves up about this, should be really proud of the role that we played in changing Iraq from what it was to what it is now becoming and the potential impact that that has on the region. I think, for example that Libya and the moves that it made in relation to WMD, I think -- I don't know because I wasn't involved in those discussions, but I wouldn't be surprised if that wasn't in part driven by them seeing these guys are serious now about this issue. I think that the -- when -- I saw the Prime Minister as closely and probably as often as anybody else, and I saw somebody of really deep conviction and integrity, who was making, without doubt, the most difficult decision of his premiership, knowing there were going to be consequences, but also understanding there are "what if" questions, had he taken another decision. Again, I thought Chris Meyer was really glib about the pontential impact on the transatlantic relationship in relation to that.
Did he just accuse someone else of being glib? Asked of regrets, he doesn't once note loss of life and he wants to call someone else glib? Really? It gets worse. Watch what happens when he's prompted about loss of life.
Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Looking at the huge cost in loss of life over, now, six and a half years, at the effects on the stability of the Middle Eastern region, at the development of international terrorism within Iraq, do you consider that, overall, the policy has succeeded?
Alastair Campbell: I do, but not without reflecting often and realising the import of the ccaveats that you have just put into that. I think, in relation to the Middle East peace process -- and bear in mind the road map is still -- the outline -- and the Prime Minister did get the Americans to go down there. I don't think they can solely be blamed for the fact that there has been such little process. I think, in terms of security, yes, the death toll has been high in terms of Iraqis, and obviously any loss of any British soldier's life is not just tragic but it obviously weighs heavily on anybody who was involved in that process, most particularly, obviously, the Prime Minister.
He yammers away but, note, he never mentions American lives. And, no, his being British is not an excuse. Every military officer testifying to the committee -- everyone -- mentioning loss of life has noted the US death toll. Campbell couldn't shut up about America or the United States when it was time to share blame. But here he notes the Iraqi death toll (he should, he's responsible for those deaths) and then pointedly declares "any loss of any British soldier's life is not just tragic but it . . ."
Let's go to the stats. The death toll for the UK forces in Iraq? 179. For the US? 4373. Repeating, every British officer appearing before the committee who has noted the death toll has been sure to include the US death toll. 4373 is not a minor number. (139 is the number of service members killed from foreign countries other than the US or the UK -- "foreign countries" means "not Iraq.")
But only some numbers matter to Campbell. Some numbers including thousands and hundreds of thousands don't matter to Campbell and never did. Wait. Let's let him explain it.
Committee Member Martin Gilbert: My last question on this relates to the extraordinary demonstration, on 15 February 2003, in which vast numbers of people, including two of my three children walked through the streets of London protesting about the Iraq war, and it was said to be one of the largest demonstrations of recent times. What account did you take of this strength of public opinion and how did it inform the Prime Minister's preparation for what was going to be this very important Parliamentary debate?
Alastair Campbell: In one very specific way -- I think the day before the march, I think I'm right that we were in Scotland. I can't remember that precisely. The march was getting huge publicity in the build-up. It was clearly going to be an enormous event, and you have got to remember this is a democracy, the Prime Minister was intending to stand for re-election, he knew that this was a deeply unpopular policy with an awful lot of people and not just unpopular, tuition fees or whatever it might have been; this was deep. I always have a rule of thumb that, if somebody goes on a march, there are probably ten others who thought about it. So there were a lot of people who were opposed. I think, what it definitely -- look, there was the political consideration. That was a big protest and he was -- he thought about it a lot and he was seized of its significance. But ultimately, I think it just made him think more deeply about the issue. The day before -- I will check the chronology on this -- he did a speech. We met some Iraqi exiles in a hotel in Scotland, who had got in touch with me actually and said -- because they sensed the UN thing going wrong, and they just came and said, "Look, he has got to see this through. He has got to see this through. We have got family back there, we know what Iraq is like. You have got all these people on the march, no doubt well-meaning, but they just do not understand the reality of this regime. Please." I took some of them to see the Prime Minister and he then made a speech where I think the line that was taken out of it by the media, he made what he called the moral case for war, becuase people were talking about the moral case, those on the march, the moral case for inaction, and the Prime Minister really just set out that there is a different view to take here and, ultimately, he didn't -- he always uwed this word. He said, "I don't disrespect those who have come to a different conclusion."
After a break, Campbell corrected his timeline, "Can I just say that the moral case speech was the day of the march?" So thousands and thousands of people march -- and Campbell believes each marcher represents ten people -- and Campbell wants to pretend that people are being respected.
Which people?
Not the marchers. They don't get a private audience with Tony Blair. Iraqi exiles -- most of whom are now KNOWN LIARS -- get to meet with Blair. Blair's moving towards war, according to Campbell, and the world sees its largest demonstration and Blair responds by? Meeting with the ones demanding the war. Not with the ones opposed.
He meets with the CHICKEN HAWKS who are TOO DAMN CHICKEN to FIGHT THEIR OWN BATTLES. The trashy exiles who sought refuge in another country and then used those countries as an operating base to drag the world into war. These trashy disgusting people, too scared to fight Saddam so they ran from their own country, demanding now that the US, the UK, Australia and other countries send in soldiers to do the job that the CHICKEN HAWKS were too scared to do themselves.
Many of the exiles were on the CIA payroll throughout their period of exile. These weren't refugees. These were thugs like the ones in Florida who plot to overthrow Cuba. No country should grant asylum to any person who doesn't agree that the host country will not be used as a staging platform for war with the country they hail from.
The exiles lived it up. And got special access. The people protesting? They got nothing. Oh, some of them were 'lucky' enough to see their sons or daughters, husbands or wives, fathers or mothers, friends sent off to fight in this illegal war. And of course the exiles returned to Iraq. Whisked back in. For photo ops. And installed into the puppet government.
Tony Blair's apology to the British should include putting them second to please a bunch of spoiled, cowardly exiles.
Iain Martin (Wall St. Journal) observes, "But there is something strange about the unyielding nature of their responses and their lack of willingness to reflect meaningfully. Almost seven years since the invasion, it is disappointing that those who drove such an important decision are not more insightful about what went wrong and right." Today was probably the most media covered day of the hearing thus far (January 29th will be the big media day if Tony Blair appears then as scheduled). Channel 4 News' Iraq Inquiry Blogger live blogged the hearing at Twitter and noted of the media, "Several satellite trucks praked outside QE2 centre. Two protestors, one billboard saying Campbell, Blair, Scarlett should be tried at Hague." Tom Baldwin (Times of London) makes this call: "Indeed, the blanket news coverage his appearance generated, showed that the passions that burned so hot over the invasion have not been cooled by either global recession or regime change in Washington and a new leader in London, as well as Baghdad." Iraq Inquiry Blogger was not the only live blogger -- Emma Griffiths live blogged for BBC News.Glen Oglaza continued live blogging for Sky News and the Guardian's Andrew Sparrow live blogged. In addition, Andrew Gilligan (Telegraph of London) -- long on this story -- live blogged and his strongest post was probably the fact checking one:
Mr Campbell's claims:
1. In evidence (Q1092) to the Commons' foreign affairs committee (FAC), he claimed: "The entire document was the product of the pen of the Joint Intelligence Committee chairman [John Scarlett]."
2. Campbell also claimed: "The allegation… that I, or anyone in Downing Street, exaggerated and distorted intelligence…is totally untrue." (para 9 of his memo to the FAC.)
3. Campbell or his deputy, Godric Smith, repeatedly claimed that there had been no political interference whatever in the dossier. For instance, at the Downing Street press briefing of 4 June 2003 (on page 6 of this PDF): "The dossier was entirely the work of the intelligence agencies… Suggestions that any pressure was put on the intelligence services by No 10 or anyone else to change the document were entirely false."
The reality:
1. The foreword of the dossier was written by Campbell, as this memo of 17 September 2002, a week before publication, makes clear. In his own evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry a few weeks ago, Scarlett himself belatedly admitted this too. The foreword was where the dossier's most incendiary statements appeared, such as the claim that the intelligence on Saddam's WMD was "beyond doubt."
2. The 17 September memo also shows that Campbell suggested 15 changes to the executive summary and main body of the document to Scarlett. Most were accepted and their effect was to harden up the document's language from possibility to probability, or probability to certainty.
3. Among the most serious: following Campbell's suggestion in the memo, a false statement, unsupported by intelligence reporting, was inserted in the dossier that Saddam had continued to "make progress" with his illicit weapons programmes.
Note that the above is an excerpt, Gilligan's fact check continues at the link. David Brown (Times of London) zooms in on the testimony regarding communications between Blair and Bully Boy Bush, "Tony Blair promised George Bush that Britain would support military action by the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein in a series of secret notes written a year before the invasion of Iraq." Philippe Naughton (Times of London) also zooms in on the notes, "Tony Blair's chief spin doctor revealed today that the former Prime Minister sent a series of notes to President Bush in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in which he made clear that Britain would 'be there' if it came to military action against Saddam Hussein." Campbell actually stated a bit more than that. He declared that, before 9-11, Blair -- who made his desire for regime change clear in the 90s -- told Bush the Middle East would be the big focus. Richard Norton-Taylor and Afua Hirsh (Guardian) go for the notes as well, "Blair was determined to disarm Saddam, Campbell said. Blair's message to the US in April 2002 was he would try to do it through UN resolutions. However, 'if the only way is regime change through military action then the British government will support the American government', Campbell said, describing Blair's view."
Al Jazeera reminds that Campbell is the one accused of having "sexed up" the pre-war 'intelligence': "Campbell, Downing Street's former director of communications and strategy, resigned in August 2003, the month after Dr David Kelly, a ministry of defence weapons expert was found dead near his home with slashed wrists. Earlier that year, he fiercely denied a BBC report that he "sexed up" a dossier claiming Iraq could launch a chemical or biological attack within 45 minutes to help justify the war." AFP reminds that following David Kelly's death, Campbell immediately slithered off, "At the time, Mr Campbell insisted he wanted to resign to spend more time with his family well before Mr Kelly's death and a previous official inquiry exonerated him over the affair. The Chilcot inquiry is not covering Mr Kelly's death." That BBC report on the 'sexed up' intell was done by Andrew Gilligan who offers these thoughts on the Inquiry members:
I was particularly pleased that they did seem to get the detail of Campbell's key alteration to the dossier, when the nuclear threat posed by Iraq was hyped up on his direct request. As other witnesses to Chilcot have said, the actual intelligence was quite clear: Iraq was not a nuclear threat. But after documented interventions by Campbell, the dossier ended up claiming that Saddam, under certain circumstances, could have the Bomb within one to two years.
Campbell claimed that his interventions were simply clarifying the dossier's nuclear wording because he "couldn't understand" it. It wasn't, in fact, a matter of expression, but of meaning -- the meaning was changed -- but the committee didn't press.
Still, they at a couple of points expressed the mandarin equivalents of "This is wrong" and "I don't believe it." It remains to be seen whether this is more than token independent-mindedness -- but if it is more, it augurs well for the final report.
And those who prefer or need video/audio can click here for Gilligan offering his thoughts on today's hearing to the BBC. The Daily Mail weighs in, "Quite the most striking aspect of Alastair Campbell's evidence to the Iraq War inquiry is that most of it was untrue. Blatantly, breathtakingly untrue. Take his claim that he was not making the case for war when he produced his dossier on Saddam Hussein's (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction. Oh, yes you were, Mr Campbell. That was the whole point of the exercise."
The Iraq Inquiry continues tomorrow. Meanwhile, another finding on the illegal was arrives. David Charter (Times of London) reports:
The invasion of Iraq had no sound mandate under international law, according to the Dutch inquiry into the war released this morning.In a devastating rejection of the position of the British and Dutch governments, the inquiry, led by the former head of the Netherlands' Supreme Court, decided that the United Nations resolutions did not provide a legal basis for the use of force.Dutch ministers were further criticised in the report of the Davids Commission, which sat for ten months, for using intelligence from Britain and the US that showed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rather than the "more nuanced" assessment of its own secret services.
Today BBC News offers this analysis: "The report demolishes the Dutch ase for supporting the invasion, says the BBC's Europe correspondent Jonny Dymond. It could also be taken to reinforce the international case against the Iraq war, he says." The Times of India explains, "The commission's report said the wording of UN resolution 1441 'cannot reasonably be interpreted (as the Dutch government did) as authorising individual member states to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's resolutions.' The resolution, passed in 2002, had offered Iraq 'a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations'." Gilbert Kreijger (Independent of London) adds, "The report said the Dutch government did not adequately inform parliament in 2002 and 2003 about a US request that it support planning for the invasion, and about the timing of Dutch logistical support for the invasion." Radio Netherlands reports on the reaction of the country's Labour Party noting, "Marietta Hamer, leader of Labour's parliamentary party, says she was 'unpleasantly surprised' by Mr Balkenende's response to the report. Labour has called on Mr Balkenende to emphasise the difference between the 2003 cabinet -- the party was in opposition at the time -- and the current one. The party has called for another response to the criticisms in the Davids report this week."
Turning to political news. First up, Jalal Talabani's heart has yet to completely fail him so he must have one. He certainly zips over to the US to have his arteries zipped clean often enough. But the president of Iraq -- who can't run for re-election because he's become one of the most despised politicians in the Kurdistan region (where he hails from -- declaring Kurdish independence a dream that must be tossed aside is what killed his party's chances in the summer elections) and who is supposed to be out of office by the end of the month -- can't stop 'suggesting' at a time when so few want to hear from him. Waleed Ibrahim, Jim Loney, Missy Ryan and Lin Noueihed (Reuters) report that today he called for measures exempting Parliament from prosecution because he's offended by some statements and he just knows these are Ba'athist statements. The only 'bath' Jalal knows from is the grease bath he absorbs each and every meal. This is the man who toppled in a Chicago bookstore and his own detail team needed help lifting him. In July the KRG held elections and one winner was Barham Saleh. As such he left his position as Nouri al-Maliki's deputy prime minister. AFP reports Roz Nuri Shawis has been made the new deputy prime minister. Meanwhile Alsumaria TV reports today: "Iraqi MP Izzat Al Shabandar escaped an assassination attempt in Al Jadriya District near the bridge leading to the presidential palace and Baghdad University Compound." They also note that 1 Iraqi Christian -- 50-year-old Hikamt Elias -- was shot dead in Mosul yesterday. But the big news will probably be the ongoing crackdown in Iraq's capital. Waleed Ibrahim, Jim Loney and Janet Lawrence (Reuters) report Baghdad is under curfew with at least 25 people arrested. What's known? Damn little. So you know the New York Times is all over it, pressed up against it, breathless and heavy panting. Today's groper is Timothy Williams. It's always cute when the paper goes weak knee-ed over claims instead of stating outright, "The following are claims by an installed government desperate to remain in office and we cannot verify any of what follows." So Nouri's image took a beating and now he claims he has stopped at least 4 -- count 'em, 4 -- suicide bombings today. You know what? The moon didn't crash into the earth today either. Maybe Nouri should claim credit for that as well. I'm sure the New York Times would breathlessly repeat it. The same Timmy that gushes today of how "the plot discovered by the Iraqi government on Tuesday would have been devastating if carried out." Much more devastating, of course, if it were a real plot. But Timmy can't verify that and why do reporting when there are so many fewer rules in 'reporting.' Besides, it's fun too! Watch: Timothy Williams denies rumors that he is pregnant with Nouri al-Maliki's child insisting that thus far, they've just done a half-and-half (mutual jackoff), government sources say. See! Fun!
An Iraqi correspondent for McClatchy Newspapers explains that the curfew lasted for two hours and that rumors flew like crazy:
The rumors today reminded me with those during Saddam regime when Saddam's followers used to spread rumors to control Iraqis and they strongly succeeded . Rumors are the most powerful weapons in Iraq an unfortunately, my people are very easy victims for this weapon.
Poor Timmy, from headline to text, Chip Cummins (Wall St. Journal) does a much better job establishing what's known and what's claimed. Xinhua adds, "A police source told Xinhua that the Iraqi forces mainly focused their search operations on eastern Baghdad neighborhoods, including the Shiite bastion of Sadr City, which has long been the stronghold of Mahdi Army militia, loyal to radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr."
Laith Hammoudi (McClatchy Newspapers) reports a suicide car bombing outside Baquba which claimed the lives of 3 guards of "The manager of the economic security Directorate Captain Raid Akram" and the life of Akram as well.
Lastly, in the US, Morris Davis is fighting for his liberty. Matthew Rothschild (The Progressive) details how the man who objected to Bush's attempts at a kangaroo court (Guantanamo) retired and went to work for the Library of Congress only to be fired there for his personal, off the job, comments:
While there, he continued to speak out against the military tribunals in Guantanamo. In an op-ed on November 10, 2009, in the Wall Street Journal, he took issue with the Obama Justice Department's decision to try some Guantanamo detainees in federal court and others in military court.
"In effect, it means that the standard of justice for each detainee will depend in large part upon the government's assessment of how high the prosecution's evidence can jump and which evidentiary bar it can clear," he wrote. "The evidence likely to clear the high bar gets gold medal justice: a traditional trial in our federal courts. The evidence unable to clear the federal court standard is forced to settle for a military commission trial, a specially created forum that has faltered repeatedly for more than seven years. That is a double standard I suspect we would condemn if it was applied to us."
He also published a letter to the editor in The Washington Post on the same date, criticizing former Attorney General Michael Mukasey for contending that "the decision to try Guantanamo detainees in federal courts comes down to a choice between protecting the American people and showcasing American justice." This, said Davis, was "fear mongering."
The ACLU is representing Davis and Rachel Myers explains, "Col. Davis has a constitutional right to speak about issues of which he has expert knowledge, and the public has a right to hear from him. Davis, and other public employees, don't check their free speech rights at the Library of Congress gate."
iraq
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Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Monday, January 11, 2010
Jeremy Scahill needs to grow up
Monday. Let's start with a laugh. This is Isaiah's The World Today Just Nuts "What Harry Worry?"
Mr. Worthless apparently didn't have the CIA to feed him over the weekend so he decided to go Arts & Leisure. The way to go, he decided was to attack Kathryn Bigelow because Blackwater was used as trainers in The Hurt Locker.
They were?
I have no idea. He says they were. Based on an actor's ravings. Never trust an actor. An actress, yes. An actor? You're asking for trouble.
But who the hell cares if she did?
If your argument is Blackwater is pure evil and damaging to various populations, then her using Blackwater kept them off the streets and citizens safe for a little bit.
But if Blackwater and the people who work for them are so evil then maybe Jeremy shouldn't have tried to turn former employees into heroes.
I am remembering one man who worked for Blackwater and was killed in Iraq and Jeremy just loved that man. Told us all about him. How he'd trained Demi Moore for GI Jane.
Jeremy doesn't like it when people know his actual history.
I'm so damn sick of that s**t.
Jeremy pitches the September 2007 massacre in Baghdad. But either is too stupid or too much of a liar to tell readers at Bad Garbage that filming on The Hurt Locker began in July of 2007. That would mean training took place before that. That would mean contracts were signed before even that.
Jeremy has no fame and no name. He and Amy Goodman are now estranged (catty fights between the two) and he can only get on TV by talking Blackwater so he goes to that well over and over even if it's something this trivial.
He doesn't care about putting Blackwater out of business. We saw that when he attacked Hillary Clinton for promising that, if elected president, she'd stop Blackwater operating in Iraq. A promise that Barack refused to make. Jeremy gave excuses for Barack. But used Blackwater to attack Hillary non-stop.
Now he's trying to use it to attack Kathryn Bigelow (whom, if Blackwater was hired, didn't necessarily hire them, the studio may have).
Now if her lead actor -- the one shooting off his mouth (and, oops, for Jeremy, the actor's latest version doesn't match up with earlier versions) -- needed training who was she supposed to use? The US military? Maybe they'd give the film a stamp of approval as well?
I've had with Jeremy Scahill and his hatred of women.
He used Blackwater to destroy the first woman who ever had a serious shot at the presidency. Now he uses it to try to destroy the first woman who has a serious shot at winning Best Director.
I'm tired of him and tired of his garbage. He needs to grow up.
"Iraq snapshot" (The Common Ills):
Monday, January 11, 2010. Chaos and violence continue, Iraq and Iran continue to have border disputes but oil concerns are replaced with nuclear ones, the Iraq Inquiry hears about many things including Harry Potter, new documents indicate Tony Blair's government may have altered assertions to match up with George W. Bush, the Netherlands has their own Iraq issues brewing, and more.
Starting in London where the Iraq Inquiry resumed their public hearings for the week. The Inquiry is chaired by John Chilcot. Channel 4 News' Iraq Inquiry Blogger blogs and tweets the public hearing and notes:
Two weekend nuggets that you may have missed, especially if you're not a Twitter follower. By a strange twist of synchronicity, exactly one hour before the Campbell session starts at 10h00, the Dutch equivalent of the Chilcot inquiry will release its own report on that country's involvement in Iraq.
I won't pretend to follow the minutiae of Netherlands politics but at least one media report suggests that "Tuesday could be the blackest day" of the Dutch PM's career: it sounds as though he resisted the creation of the "Davids Commission" as long as he possibly could. No parallels there then.
The second thing Iraq Inquiry Blogger notes is this BBC profile of committee member Roderic Lyne. Glen Oglaza (Sky News) is also providing live Twittering of the Iraq Inquiry. On the Dutch issue, Radio Netherlands states the country's prime minister, Jan Peter Balkenende's future "could [be] deterime[d]" by the findings: "Unless the commission resolves all doubts about the level of Dutch support, the lower house will in all likelihood demand a full parliamentary enquiry. One of the main questions that many people hope the Davids Commission will answer is whether the cabinet fully informed the lower house about the Netherlands' involvement in Iraq. Rumours about the involvement of Dutch special forces and intelligence operatives have been circulating since the invasion and if they prove to be true, it could lead to the prime minister's resignation."
Today the Iraq Inquiry heard from Lt Gen Richard Shirref and Maj Gen Jonathan Shaw (link goes to video and transcript options). Shaw commander the British M-NF forces from January 2007 to August of 2007 while Shirref was in charge from July 2006 until Shaw took over. British forces were primarily in and around Basra and the now forgotten Maysan.
Lt Gen Richard Shirref: The two provinces which were principally the concern of the British, Maysan and Basra, were a different story though. Maysan had always been a very difficult province. There were effectively no security at all where MNF were concerned. The cities of Amarah and Majarr-al-Kabir were effectively no-go areas, and in particular Amarah; any operations into Amarah resulted in significant fighting, at times up to battle group level. The principal British base in Maysan, Camp Abu Naji, was being subjected to continuous attack, as was any movment up and down the route to and from that camp.
For an overview of what the British faced in 2006, this is from the November 22, 2006 snapshot:
In England, This Is London reports: "Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett this afternoon surprised MPs by signalling the countdown to a withdrawal from Iraq. She told the Commons that Basra, where the bulk of the UK's 7,200 personnel are stationed, could be handed over from British military control to Iraqi forces as early as next spring." Basra has been a violent area for British soldiers (and for Iraqis). Earlier this month, on England's Rememberance Sunday, four British troops were killed while on a boat patrol in Basra and three more were wounded. The four killed included Sharron Elliott who was "the second British female servicewoman to die in action." The other three were Jason Hylton, Ben Nowak, and Lee Hopkins. Mortar attacks have been common in Basra and, in August, a British soldier died as a result of wounds received from mortar rounds. In October, a British soldier died in Basra from road traffic. The end of October was also when the British consulate in Basra was evacuated after it was decided it was no longer safe after two months of mortar attacks. (In August, British troops 'evacuated' from their base in Amara due to repeated mortar attacks.)
Amara would have been a topic to explore. The British fled with no notice. The base was then ripped apart by 'insurgents' in less than 12 hours of the British fleeing. The committee largely ignored the issue. Committee member Lawrence Freedman did observe, "Effectively, our forces were spending a lot of their time protecting themselves and were therefore not available for other tasks." Shirref didn't want to go into as anything other than a fleeting mention and he quickly asserted Basra was all that mattered.
Lt Gen Richard Shirreff: Basra itself seemed to me to be the key issue, the second city of Iraq, and it was in Basra that the British reputation was going to stand or fall. What I found when I arrived was effectively no security at all. Any movement required deliberate operation to conduct -- to get around the city. There was a significant lack of troops on the ground. I think when I went out on my recce in May 2006, the single battalion commander responsible for a city of 1.3 million people told me that he could put no more than 13 half platoons or multiples on the ground, less than 200 soldiers on the ground, in a city of 1.3 million. You compare that, for example, with what I recall, as a young platoon commander in West Belfast in the late 1970s when there was a brigade on the ground. The result of all that was what I call a cycle of insecurity. No security meant no reconstruction and development, it meant a loss of consent, the militia filled the gap and, effectively, the militia controlled the city. So my objective was to re-establish security in Basra.
Committee Member Lawrence Freedman: You say "re-establish," what you have described is a pretty gloomy prospect. How do you think, after all this time, this situation had been allowed to develop?
Lt Gen Richard Shirreff: I can't answer that. All I can tell you is the situation as I found it.
Of the day's other witness, Richard Norton-Taylor (Guardian of England) observes, "Maj Gen Jonathan Shaw, British commander based in Basra in 2007, told the inquiry that Basra was 17th on the department's list of priorities. That British forces there had to rely on US money was 'pretty shaming', Shaw said." Where did American money go -- identified by Shirreff as "US tax payer money," which it is, but let's note he was aware of it and credited it as such repeatedly in his own testimony -- on propaganda films according to Shirreff (he didn't use the word "propaganda") which aired on local televsion. Back to Shaw. He used the term "the dark state" and was asked of it, told it sounded like something out of Harry Potter leading him to reply it wasn't JK Rowling:
What it meant, therefore, was that you had a direct link between the people in power advising Maliki sat in his Cabinet down through the shadow state and down to their militias, the sort of violent militias, the criminals, the murderers and the terrorists at the bottom, there was a strict linkage between those three, and so what you ended up with was a system where the dark state was protected by the official state.
Tomorrow Alastair Campbell appears before the Iraq Inquiry and his appearance comes after a revelation over the weekend. Chris Ames (Guardian) explains:Once again it is the media -- rather than the Iraq inquiry – who are putting new information about Iraq into the public domain. In today's Guardian, Richard Norton-Taylor and I reveal the extent to which the notorious September 2002 dossier on Iraq's WMD was sexed-up on Alastair Campbell's instructions to fit in with bogus American claims. The idea that Campbell and intelligence chief John Scarlett were unwitting participants in accidental sexing-up has taken another blow. There is a prologue and an epilogue to today's story. The prologue shows that Campbell and Scarlett knew exactly what they were doing. The epilogue shows that Campbell was still not happy, even after the dossier's worst-case estimate of how quickly Saddam Hussein could get a bomb was effectively halved to fit in with what George W Bush had told the UN. According to his published diaries, on 2 April 2002 Campbell and Scarlett were at a meeting at Chequers where Tony Blair had made clear that the aim of UK government policy was "regime change". Three weeks later Campbell met officials including Scarlett "to go through what we needed to do communications wise to set the scene for Iraq, eg a WMD paper and other papers about Saddam. Scarlett a very good bloke." In July 2002, Blair, Campbell and Scarlett were all present at the now famous Downing Street meeting where Sir Richard Dearlove, the then head of MI6, reported that in the US "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" of invading Iraq.
Tim Shipman (Daily Mail) adds, "The first draft of the British dossier was completed, using intelligence from MI6, on Septemofber 10, 2002. It concluded that it would take 'at least two years' for Iraq to get a nuclear bomb. But two days later President Bush used a keynote address to the United Nations to declare: 'Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year'." And "11 days later," Tony Blair began stating publicly "a year or two."
Turning to political issues in Iraq. Last week, many of Nouri's political rivals were informed they were being banned from the expected March elections. Today Michael Jansen (Irish Times) reported, "IRAQ'S NATIONAL security council, the country's highest political body, yesterday discussed a call to ban 15 political parties and candidates from standing in the March 7th parliamentary election on the grounds that they are tied to the outlawed Baath Party. If accepted by the election commission, the proposal, put forward by a body charged with purging Baathists, would deny representation to both Sunni and secular Iraqis and torpedo any chance of national unity." Robert Dreyfuss (The Nation) adds:
The commission is heir to the old De-Baathification Commission, set up in 2003 by Paul Bremer, the US czar of Iraq, and led by Ahmed Chalabi and his cronies. Among those banned was one of Iraq's most significant players, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a secular Sunni leader and an important member of parliament, whose National Dialogue Front is a popular vote-getter among Iraq's disenfranchised Sunni populace. Mutlaq, a well-known politician, has drawn support from current and former Baathists, secular Sunnis opposed to the Shiite-sectarian rulers in Baghdad, and Iraqis concerned about the intrusive influence of Iran in Iraqi affairs.
Over the past several months, Mutlaq had helped to build a powerful opposition bloc set to challenge both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who controls a faction of the secretive, sectarian Shiite Dawa party, and the broader Shiite alliance comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr's forces, and Chalabi, the neoconservatives' favorite wheeler-dealer. That alliance was formed with the strong support of Iran, whose authoritarian leaders and radical clerics helped assemble it. ISCI, which has a paramilitary arm, the Badr Brigade, was formed in 1982 as an arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and for many years it was actually under the command of Iranian military officers. Sadr, a mercurial Shiite nationalist, has fallen under Iran's umbrella, too, and he has spent most of the past two years living in Qom, Iran's religious capital. Chalabi, despite his neocon connections, has long been suspected of having covert ties to Iran's intelligence service.
Bremer was responsible for de-Ba'athification. But who was responsible for de-de-Ba'athifcation. The White House (under Bush) made that one of the Iraq benchmarks -- benchmarks Nouri signed off on. To bring the Ba'athists back in was one of the benchmarks and a weak law was tossed around Parliament but not implemented and when is anything going to be done about that? And why is the US propping up the government it created? Have we all forgotten the Pentagon Papers and the shocking revelation that the government was admitting the US was in Vietnam to prop up the government they'd created? Nouri al-Maliki signed off on those benchmarks and was never forced to follow them. James Cogan (WSWS) notes some troubling signs:
Tensions in Sunni communities were already rising before this latest provocation. The attempt to proscribe Mutlaq and other Sunni parties follows the rewriting of the electoral law by the Shiite and Kurdish parties to reduce the proportion of seats elected in Sunni areas. There have also been reports of widespread arrests and killings of Sunnis by government troops and police.
According to the newspaper Azzaman, "hundreds of young people have been taken away from Tikrit, Anbar and Mosul". In Baghdad, there have allegedly been numerous arrests in the Sunni majority district of Abu Ghraib, in the west of the city. At least 10 militiamen of the Sunni "Awakening" militias in the capital have reportedly been assassinated.
The Obama administration has made no public comment on the actions of the Justice and Accountability Board. However, it can hardly welcome a development that threatens to inflame communal tensions and undermine arrangements that underpin its plans to reduce troop numbers down to 50,000 by August and redirect US forces to Afghanistan.
It is barely two years since the US military struck a deal with the bulk of the Sunni-based insurgency to abandon armed resistance in exchange for an end to sectarian persecution by Shiite forces, regular payment and implicit guarantees of greater political influence for the Sunni elite.
This as NPR's Quil Lawrence (Morning Edition, text and audio link) reports on the one-time 'model' Anbar Province which is now seeing increased violence and disenchanted citiznes who protest with chants of "Save us" and "We've been sold out." The "model" depended upon cash. In April 2008, Gen David Petraeus and US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker explained to Congressional committees how the 'model' worked: The US military paid Sunni 'insurgents' cash to stop attacking US military equipment and US service members. The US appears to have stopped payments around the month of June of this year and Nouri -- who was supposed to take over payments long ago -- sometimes pays, sometimes pays a portion and sometimes tells these 'insurgents' (who became Sawha -- "Awakenings," "Sons Of Iraq") the check's in the mail. With payments questionable (and Arab media reports rumors that payments end this month) and with the bulk of Sahwa still not brought into Iraqi security forces, many Sahwa no longer feel the need to do what they were once paid for.
Moving to border issues. WashingtonTV reports that Iraq has asked the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agnecy about Iran's reported plans "to build a nuclear reactor near the border between the two countries." Energy and border issues appear to go hand-in-hand for Iraq and Iran. In December, the world was left to sort out the competing claims (as oil prices soared) that Iran had or was occupying an Iraqi oil field. Iran denied the occupation and/or insisted that it was Iran's oil field anyway while Iraq insisted the occupation was taking place and that it was Iraq's oil fields. As noted in Friday's snapshot, Alice Fordham (Times of London) reported that Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq's Foreign Minister) met with Manouchehr Mottaki (Iran's Foreign Minister) in Baghdad to address the Fakka oil field: "Both ministers indicated after the meeting that they had not been able to resolve the ownership of the parts of Fakka oil field disputed since the 1988 end of the Iran-Iraq war, nor had they agreed on a version of what happened in the incursion. Mr Zebari said that after 'direct action' was taken by the Iraqi Government the Iranian flag was lowered at the site, while Mr Mottaki said that the Iraqi side might have been partly to blame." The Tehran Times reported that the two reached "important agreements for resolving the disputes over their borders" and that Iran would build a fence to settle the Fakka oil field dispute. UPI observed, 'If Iran took control of the southern fields it, rather than Iraq, would surpass Saudi Arabia, its Sunni-dominated regional rival." Yesterday Press TV quoted Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran's Ambassador to Iraq, stating, "The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq and environmental issues have to some extent shifted the border demacrations between the two countries, if corrected the uncertainty regarding the Fakkeh oil field can be resolved."
Iran and Iraq's relations were the subject of the latest Inside Iraq (Al Jazeera) where moderator Jasim al-Azzawi was joined by Issam al-Chalabi (Iraq's Oil Minister, 1987 - 1990) and Seyed Mohammad Marandi (University of Tehran).
Jasim al-Azzawi: Issam al-Chalabi, some Iraqi politicians, including the prime minister, they downplayed the importance of the Iranian incursion and the seizure of the Fakkah oil well. Iran calls it a misunderstanding. What is your take? What is your interpretation of the Iranian action?
Issam al-Chalabi: First of all, I'm not surprised by the reactions from Maliki and some of his aides and politicians because of their bad past history. And there is doubt about their loyalty. It is questionable. They were brought up in Iran and Iran is like a godfather to them. As for the Iranian? I really am not surprised by such action because this is not the first time. It happened so many times throughout the past century, throughout the past decades, with every single Iraqi regime regardless of whether it was a monarchy or a republican. Even when we have a regime that's considered to be a brotherly regime like the one we have with Iran, yet we see that Iran had overstepped and infringed on the sovereignty of Iraq. I am a bit surprised: Why did they use force? If they had such a good relationship with the Iraqi government, couldn't they sit down and talk if they had any grievances, if they had any claim on any piece of land or anything else? That is something that makes me wonder what is behind the action and the time of the Iranian regime.
Jasim al-Azzawi: Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Issam al-Chalabi, is wondering about the reason behind it and, before you answer that, history as well as the last bilateral agreement signed between Iraq and Iran with the help of Algiers in 1975, the famous agreement [1975 Algiers Agreement], shows that Fakkah is on Iraqi land. You're not disputing that are you?
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: No. I think it's obvious that the Iranians have no problem with the Algiers Accord. I think that was the reason why Saddam Hussein invaded and destroyed both of the -- much of the infrastructure of both countries as a result and of course he had the support of many Western countries and many regimes in the region, as well, at that time. Iranians from the very start, even during the war, they said that that is the basis of any agreement with Iraq. And fortunately, the current Iraqi government says the same thing as well. Iran has no problem with the border. The problem was that basically this region, because of the war and because of the problems that Iraq had after the invasion of Kuwait -- a weak central government, and then the chaos that ensued after the American invasion of the country, the border isn't all that clear in some spots. Exactly where it should stand is not clear. Should it be a few hundred metres --
Jasim al-Azzawi: That is not a very good explaination, Seyed Mohammad Marandi. You'll have to much better than that.
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: Well -- I think it's quite clear: The border has to be defined by a joint-committee on both sides and both sides have agreed to establish a joint-committee to demarcate the land so that it is precise where things stand. Otherwise it wasn't a major issue at all. And I don't think the Iranians had any intentions or the Iraqi government had any intention to create any problems between the two countries. I think that there are forces both within the borders of Iraq and without that want an excuse to create tensions between Iran and Iraq. I think countries like Saudi Arabia, the United States and some people who are remanents of the Ba'athist regime would like to create a superficial crisis that is really non-existent and there is no reason --
Issam al-Chalabi: Can I?
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: -- for either side to have any trouble. It is easy resolvable --
Jasim al-Azzawi: I am surprised, Seyed Marandi, that you would blame some regional countries rather than the actions of the Iranian government. Ironically, it was Iran which after the agreement signed between Iraq and Iran deposited all the agreement of the 1975, including the protocols regarding borders, which included 262 border stakes, the coordinates of which, the location, the description, all that was deposited with the United Nations. So, Issam al-Chalabi, I am asking you this time, why doesn't the Iraqi government publish the agreement to show everybody exactly who owns what?
Issam al-Chalabi: With all due respect to Dr. Marandi, I think he needs to correct some of his information. As you mentioned correctly, this had all been settled with the Algerian Accord and the protocols were signed by the ministers of Foreign Affairs of both Iraq and Iran and Algeria. Then it was Abdelaziz Boutefilka, the current president of Algeria. And then it was Iran itself who deposited the documents, all the documents, all the protocols, including the coordinates of the border because on the markers with the descriptions to the United Nations in both languages -- English and French -- it doesn't take much. If they don't have it in Iran, if they don't have it in Baghdad, they can simply ask the Secretary General of the United Nations, 'For God's sake, send us a copy and then we sit down." The problem --
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: I think you misunderstood what I was saying though.
Issam al-Chalabi: Okay, can I just finish please, Dr. Marandi? What happened maybe during the Iraq-Iran war that some of the markers had been destroyed on the border there but then it's not that difficult. You have the maps, we have the coordinates, then simply ask for them and put them back again. It doesn't require forces from anybody.
Turning to violence, today Reuters notes a Baghdad sticky bombing has left three people (employed by an Iraqi MP) were injured, a Baghdad roadside bombing which injured four people (including three police officers) and, dropping back to Sunday, a Baghdad sticky bombing which wounded six people.
In the US, the Dept of Defense and the VA has put together a suicide prevention conference "held at the Hyatt Regency on Capital Hill, 400 New Jersey Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., on Jan. 11-13 from 8 a.m. -- 5 p.m. EST." This as Kimberly Hefling (AP) reports that the VA announced a 26% increase during the years 2005 through 2007 in veteran suicides.
Matthew Rothschild's guest on this week's The Progressive Radio Show is Nona Willis Aronowitz and I'm noting the non-Iraq related show because of her mother, the late Ellen Willis, who was a wonderful woman and a good friend. Nona's father is the noted left thinker Stanley Aronowitz who has a new piece at ZNet calling for people on the left to make a break from the forces that hold them back and suggesting "the starting point would be the left's clean break from the Democrats." Read the piece in full and, no, that's not a prankster impersonating Carl in the comments, he really is that much of a crackpot and a liar. Yes, the same Carl who helped for "Progressives" for Obama, the same Carl who injected himself into a Democratic Party primary is now attempting to claim otherwise. From his grave, Stalin watches in open-mouthed shock and admiration at Carl's continual efforts to revise his own personal history. Back to Nona, you can find out more about her writing at her website including the book she and Emma Bee Bernstein wrote Girldrive -- Criss-crossing America, Redefining Feminism.
We'll close with this from Debra Sweet's "Guantanamo Turns 8 While More Lives Slip Away" (World Can't Wait):Monday January 11 is the 8th anniversary of the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo. The emblematic symbol of the Bush regime's "war on terror," in which men have been openly tortured, kept in isolation, force-fed, and for years deprived of any legal respresentation or contact with the outside world, is still open.It's being called "Obama's prison" now. On January 22, 2009, the new president announced that he would close Guantanamo in a year because it's existence was a public relations nightmare for U.S. foreign policy makers. As of this week, there's no closing date, but a vague indication it could be closed in 2011.
Sweet also notes, "Protests of John Yoo on both ends of the country Tuesday, Jan. 12th! Fire, Disbar, and Prosecute War Criminal John Yoo! John Yoo, principal author of the "torture memos" justifying the Bush torture enterprise, is on a book tour, appearing on Jon Stewart's show (!) Monday night."
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Monday, January 11, 2010. Chaos and violence continue, Iraq and Iran continue to have border disputes but oil concerns are replaced with nuclear ones, the Iraq Inquiry hears about many things including Harry Potter, new documents indicate Tony Blair's government may have altered assertions to match up with George W. Bush, the Netherlands has their own Iraq issues brewing, and more.
Starting in London where the Iraq Inquiry resumed their public hearings for the week. The Inquiry is chaired by John Chilcot. Channel 4 News' Iraq Inquiry Blogger blogs and tweets the public hearing and notes:
Two weekend nuggets that you may have missed, especially if you're not a Twitter follower. By a strange twist of synchronicity, exactly one hour before the Campbell session starts at 10h00, the Dutch equivalent of the Chilcot inquiry will release its own report on that country's involvement in Iraq.
I won't pretend to follow the minutiae of Netherlands politics but at least one media report suggests that "Tuesday could be the blackest day" of the Dutch PM's career: it sounds as though he resisted the creation of the "Davids Commission" as long as he possibly could. No parallels there then.
The second thing Iraq Inquiry Blogger notes is this BBC profile of committee member Roderic Lyne. Glen Oglaza (Sky News) is also providing live Twittering of the Iraq Inquiry. On the Dutch issue, Radio Netherlands states the country's prime minister, Jan Peter Balkenende's future "could [be] deterime[d]" by the findings: "Unless the commission resolves all doubts about the level of Dutch support, the lower house will in all likelihood demand a full parliamentary enquiry. One of the main questions that many people hope the Davids Commission will answer is whether the cabinet fully informed the lower house about the Netherlands' involvement in Iraq. Rumours about the involvement of Dutch special forces and intelligence operatives have been circulating since the invasion and if they prove to be true, it could lead to the prime minister's resignation."
Today the Iraq Inquiry heard from Lt Gen Richard Shirref and Maj Gen Jonathan Shaw (link goes to video and transcript options). Shaw commander the British M-NF forces from January 2007 to August of 2007 while Shirref was in charge from July 2006 until Shaw took over. British forces were primarily in and around Basra and the now forgotten Maysan.
Lt Gen Richard Shirref: The two provinces which were principally the concern of the British, Maysan and Basra, were a different story though. Maysan had always been a very difficult province. There were effectively no security at all where MNF were concerned. The cities of Amarah and Majarr-al-Kabir were effectively no-go areas, and in particular Amarah; any operations into Amarah resulted in significant fighting, at times up to battle group level. The principal British base in Maysan, Camp Abu Naji, was being subjected to continuous attack, as was any movment up and down the route to and from that camp.
For an overview of what the British faced in 2006, this is from the November 22, 2006 snapshot:
In England, This Is London reports: "Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett this afternoon surprised MPs by signalling the countdown to a withdrawal from Iraq. She told the Commons that Basra, where the bulk of the UK's 7,200 personnel are stationed, could be handed over from British military control to Iraqi forces as early as next spring." Basra has been a violent area for British soldiers (and for Iraqis). Earlier this month, on England's Rememberance Sunday, four British troops were killed while on a boat patrol in Basra and three more were wounded. The four killed included Sharron Elliott who was "the second British female servicewoman to die in action." The other three were Jason Hylton, Ben Nowak, and Lee Hopkins. Mortar attacks have been common in Basra and, in August, a British soldier died as a result of wounds received from mortar rounds. In October, a British soldier died in Basra from road traffic. The end of October was also when the British consulate in Basra was evacuated after it was decided it was no longer safe after two months of mortar attacks. (In August, British troops 'evacuated' from their base in Amara due to repeated mortar attacks.)
Amara would have been a topic to explore. The British fled with no notice. The base was then ripped apart by 'insurgents' in less than 12 hours of the British fleeing. The committee largely ignored the issue. Committee member Lawrence Freedman did observe, "Effectively, our forces were spending a lot of their time protecting themselves and were therefore not available for other tasks." Shirref didn't want to go into as anything other than a fleeting mention and he quickly asserted Basra was all that mattered.
Lt Gen Richard Shirreff: Basra itself seemed to me to be the key issue, the second city of Iraq, and it was in Basra that the British reputation was going to stand or fall. What I found when I arrived was effectively no security at all. Any movement required deliberate operation to conduct -- to get around the city. There was a significant lack of troops on the ground. I think when I went out on my recce in May 2006, the single battalion commander responsible for a city of 1.3 million people told me that he could put no more than 13 half platoons or multiples on the ground, less than 200 soldiers on the ground, in a city of 1.3 million. You compare that, for example, with what I recall, as a young platoon commander in West Belfast in the late 1970s when there was a brigade on the ground. The result of all that was what I call a cycle of insecurity. No security meant no reconstruction and development, it meant a loss of consent, the militia filled the gap and, effectively, the militia controlled the city. So my objective was to re-establish security in Basra.
Committee Member Lawrence Freedman: You say "re-establish," what you have described is a pretty gloomy prospect. How do you think, after all this time, this situation had been allowed to develop?
Lt Gen Richard Shirreff: I can't answer that. All I can tell you is the situation as I found it.
Of the day's other witness, Richard Norton-Taylor (Guardian of England) observes, "Maj Gen Jonathan Shaw, British commander based in Basra in 2007, told the inquiry that Basra was 17th on the department's list of priorities. That British forces there had to rely on US money was 'pretty shaming', Shaw said." Where did American money go -- identified by Shirreff as "US tax payer money," which it is, but let's note he was aware of it and credited it as such repeatedly in his own testimony -- on propaganda films according to Shirreff (he didn't use the word "propaganda") which aired on local televsion. Back to Shaw. He used the term "the dark state" and was asked of it, told it sounded like something out of Harry Potter leading him to reply it wasn't JK Rowling:
What it meant, therefore, was that you had a direct link between the people in power advising Maliki sat in his Cabinet down through the shadow state and down to their militias, the sort of violent militias, the criminals, the murderers and the terrorists at the bottom, there was a strict linkage between those three, and so what you ended up with was a system where the dark state was protected by the official state.
Tomorrow Alastair Campbell appears before the Iraq Inquiry and his appearance comes after a revelation over the weekend. Chris Ames (Guardian) explains:Once again it is the media -- rather than the Iraq inquiry – who are putting new information about Iraq into the public domain. In today's Guardian, Richard Norton-Taylor and I reveal the extent to which the notorious September 2002 dossier on Iraq's WMD was sexed-up on Alastair Campbell's instructions to fit in with bogus American claims. The idea that Campbell and intelligence chief John Scarlett were unwitting participants in accidental sexing-up has taken another blow. There is a prologue and an epilogue to today's story. The prologue shows that Campbell and Scarlett knew exactly what they were doing. The epilogue shows that Campbell was still not happy, even after the dossier's worst-case estimate of how quickly Saddam Hussein could get a bomb was effectively halved to fit in with what George W Bush had told the UN. According to his published diaries, on 2 April 2002 Campbell and Scarlett were at a meeting at Chequers where Tony Blair had made clear that the aim of UK government policy was "regime change". Three weeks later Campbell met officials including Scarlett "to go through what we needed to do communications wise to set the scene for Iraq, eg a WMD paper and other papers about Saddam. Scarlett a very good bloke." In July 2002, Blair, Campbell and Scarlett were all present at the now famous Downing Street meeting where Sir Richard Dearlove, the then head of MI6, reported that in the US "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" of invading Iraq.
Tim Shipman (Daily Mail) adds, "The first draft of the British dossier was completed, using intelligence from MI6, on Septemofber 10, 2002. It concluded that it would take 'at least two years' for Iraq to get a nuclear bomb. But two days later President Bush used a keynote address to the United Nations to declare: 'Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year'." And "11 days later," Tony Blair began stating publicly "a year or two."
Turning to political issues in Iraq. Last week, many of Nouri's political rivals were informed they were being banned from the expected March elections. Today Michael Jansen (Irish Times) reported, "IRAQ'S NATIONAL security council, the country's highest political body, yesterday discussed a call to ban 15 political parties and candidates from standing in the March 7th parliamentary election on the grounds that they are tied to the outlawed Baath Party. If accepted by the election commission, the proposal, put forward by a body charged with purging Baathists, would deny representation to both Sunni and secular Iraqis and torpedo any chance of national unity." Robert Dreyfuss (The Nation) adds:
The commission is heir to the old De-Baathification Commission, set up in 2003 by Paul Bremer, the US czar of Iraq, and led by Ahmed Chalabi and his cronies. Among those banned was one of Iraq's most significant players, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a secular Sunni leader and an important member of parliament, whose National Dialogue Front is a popular vote-getter among Iraq's disenfranchised Sunni populace. Mutlaq, a well-known politician, has drawn support from current and former Baathists, secular Sunnis opposed to the Shiite-sectarian rulers in Baghdad, and Iraqis concerned about the intrusive influence of Iran in Iraqi affairs.
Over the past several months, Mutlaq had helped to build a powerful opposition bloc set to challenge both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who controls a faction of the secretive, sectarian Shiite Dawa party, and the broader Shiite alliance comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr's forces, and Chalabi, the neoconservatives' favorite wheeler-dealer. That alliance was formed with the strong support of Iran, whose authoritarian leaders and radical clerics helped assemble it. ISCI, which has a paramilitary arm, the Badr Brigade, was formed in 1982 as an arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and for many years it was actually under the command of Iranian military officers. Sadr, a mercurial Shiite nationalist, has fallen under Iran's umbrella, too, and he has spent most of the past two years living in Qom, Iran's religious capital. Chalabi, despite his neocon connections, has long been suspected of having covert ties to Iran's intelligence service.
Bremer was responsible for de-Ba'athification. But who was responsible for de-de-Ba'athifcation. The White House (under Bush) made that one of the Iraq benchmarks -- benchmarks Nouri signed off on. To bring the Ba'athists back in was one of the benchmarks and a weak law was tossed around Parliament but not implemented and when is anything going to be done about that? And why is the US propping up the government it created? Have we all forgotten the Pentagon Papers and the shocking revelation that the government was admitting the US was in Vietnam to prop up the government they'd created? Nouri al-Maliki signed off on those benchmarks and was never forced to follow them. James Cogan (WSWS) notes some troubling signs:
Tensions in Sunni communities were already rising before this latest provocation. The attempt to proscribe Mutlaq and other Sunni parties follows the rewriting of the electoral law by the Shiite and Kurdish parties to reduce the proportion of seats elected in Sunni areas. There have also been reports of widespread arrests and killings of Sunnis by government troops and police.
According to the newspaper Azzaman, "hundreds of young people have been taken away from Tikrit, Anbar and Mosul". In Baghdad, there have allegedly been numerous arrests in the Sunni majority district of Abu Ghraib, in the west of the city. At least 10 militiamen of the Sunni "Awakening" militias in the capital have reportedly been assassinated.
The Obama administration has made no public comment on the actions of the Justice and Accountability Board. However, it can hardly welcome a development that threatens to inflame communal tensions and undermine arrangements that underpin its plans to reduce troop numbers down to 50,000 by August and redirect US forces to Afghanistan.
It is barely two years since the US military struck a deal with the bulk of the Sunni-based insurgency to abandon armed resistance in exchange for an end to sectarian persecution by Shiite forces, regular payment and implicit guarantees of greater political influence for the Sunni elite.
This as NPR's Quil Lawrence (Morning Edition, text and audio link) reports on the one-time 'model' Anbar Province which is now seeing increased violence and disenchanted citiznes who protest with chants of "Save us" and "We've been sold out." The "model" depended upon cash. In April 2008, Gen David Petraeus and US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker explained to Congressional committees how the 'model' worked: The US military paid Sunni 'insurgents' cash to stop attacking US military equipment and US service members. The US appears to have stopped payments around the month of June of this year and Nouri -- who was supposed to take over payments long ago -- sometimes pays, sometimes pays a portion and sometimes tells these 'insurgents' (who became Sawha -- "Awakenings," "Sons Of Iraq") the check's in the mail. With payments questionable (and Arab media reports rumors that payments end this month) and with the bulk of Sahwa still not brought into Iraqi security forces, many Sahwa no longer feel the need to do what they were once paid for.
Moving to border issues. WashingtonTV reports that Iraq has asked the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agnecy about Iran's reported plans "to build a nuclear reactor near the border between the two countries." Energy and border issues appear to go hand-in-hand for Iraq and Iran. In December, the world was left to sort out the competing claims (as oil prices soared) that Iran had or was occupying an Iraqi oil field. Iran denied the occupation and/or insisted that it was Iran's oil field anyway while Iraq insisted the occupation was taking place and that it was Iraq's oil fields. As noted in Friday's snapshot, Alice Fordham (Times of London) reported that Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq's Foreign Minister) met with Manouchehr Mottaki (Iran's Foreign Minister) in Baghdad to address the Fakka oil field: "Both ministers indicated after the meeting that they had not been able to resolve the ownership of the parts of Fakka oil field disputed since the 1988 end of the Iran-Iraq war, nor had they agreed on a version of what happened in the incursion. Mr Zebari said that after 'direct action' was taken by the Iraqi Government the Iranian flag was lowered at the site, while Mr Mottaki said that the Iraqi side might have been partly to blame." The Tehran Times reported that the two reached "important agreements for resolving the disputes over their borders" and that Iran would build a fence to settle the Fakka oil field dispute. UPI observed, 'If Iran took control of the southern fields it, rather than Iraq, would surpass Saudi Arabia, its Sunni-dominated regional rival." Yesterday Press TV quoted Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran's Ambassador to Iraq, stating, "The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq and environmental issues have to some extent shifted the border demacrations between the two countries, if corrected the uncertainty regarding the Fakkeh oil field can be resolved."
Iran and Iraq's relations were the subject of the latest Inside Iraq (Al Jazeera) where moderator Jasim al-Azzawi was joined by Issam al-Chalabi (Iraq's Oil Minister, 1987 - 1990) and Seyed Mohammad Marandi (University of Tehran).
Jasim al-Azzawi: Issam al-Chalabi, some Iraqi politicians, including the prime minister, they downplayed the importance of the Iranian incursion and the seizure of the Fakkah oil well. Iran calls it a misunderstanding. What is your take? What is your interpretation of the Iranian action?
Issam al-Chalabi: First of all, I'm not surprised by the reactions from Maliki and some of his aides and politicians because of their bad past history. And there is doubt about their loyalty. It is questionable. They were brought up in Iran and Iran is like a godfather to them. As for the Iranian? I really am not surprised by such action because this is not the first time. It happened so many times throughout the past century, throughout the past decades, with every single Iraqi regime regardless of whether it was a monarchy or a republican. Even when we have a regime that's considered to be a brotherly regime like the one we have with Iran, yet we see that Iran had overstepped and infringed on the sovereignty of Iraq. I am a bit surprised: Why did they use force? If they had such a good relationship with the Iraqi government, couldn't they sit down and talk if they had any grievances, if they had any claim on any piece of land or anything else? That is something that makes me wonder what is behind the action and the time of the Iranian regime.
Jasim al-Azzawi: Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Issam al-Chalabi, is wondering about the reason behind it and, before you answer that, history as well as the last bilateral agreement signed between Iraq and Iran with the help of Algiers in 1975, the famous agreement [1975 Algiers Agreement], shows that Fakkah is on Iraqi land. You're not disputing that are you?
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: No. I think it's obvious that the Iranians have no problem with the Algiers Accord. I think that was the reason why Saddam Hussein invaded and destroyed both of the -- much of the infrastructure of both countries as a result and of course he had the support of many Western countries and many regimes in the region, as well, at that time. Iranians from the very start, even during the war, they said that that is the basis of any agreement with Iraq. And fortunately, the current Iraqi government says the same thing as well. Iran has no problem with the border. The problem was that basically this region, because of the war and because of the problems that Iraq had after the invasion of Kuwait -- a weak central government, and then the chaos that ensued after the American invasion of the country, the border isn't all that clear in some spots. Exactly where it should stand is not clear. Should it be a few hundred metres --
Jasim al-Azzawi: That is not a very good explaination, Seyed Mohammad Marandi. You'll have to much better than that.
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: Well -- I think it's quite clear: The border has to be defined by a joint-committee on both sides and both sides have agreed to establish a joint-committee to demarcate the land so that it is precise where things stand. Otherwise it wasn't a major issue at all. And I don't think the Iranians had any intentions or the Iraqi government had any intention to create any problems between the two countries. I think that there are forces both within the borders of Iraq and without that want an excuse to create tensions between Iran and Iraq. I think countries like Saudi Arabia, the United States and some people who are remanents of the Ba'athist regime would like to create a superficial crisis that is really non-existent and there is no reason --
Issam al-Chalabi: Can I?
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: -- for either side to have any trouble. It is easy resolvable --
Jasim al-Azzawi: I am surprised, Seyed Marandi, that you would blame some regional countries rather than the actions of the Iranian government. Ironically, it was Iran which after the agreement signed between Iraq and Iran deposited all the agreement of the 1975, including the protocols regarding borders, which included 262 border stakes, the coordinates of which, the location, the description, all that was deposited with the United Nations. So, Issam al-Chalabi, I am asking you this time, why doesn't the Iraqi government publish the agreement to show everybody exactly who owns what?
Issam al-Chalabi: With all due respect to Dr. Marandi, I think he needs to correct some of his information. As you mentioned correctly, this had all been settled with the Algerian Accord and the protocols were signed by the ministers of Foreign Affairs of both Iraq and Iran and Algeria. Then it was Abdelaziz Boutefilka, the current president of Algeria. And then it was Iran itself who deposited the documents, all the documents, all the protocols, including the coordinates of the border because on the markers with the descriptions to the United Nations in both languages -- English and French -- it doesn't take much. If they don't have it in Iran, if they don't have it in Baghdad, they can simply ask the Secretary General of the United Nations, 'For God's sake, send us a copy and then we sit down." The problem --
Seyed Mohammad Marandi: I think you misunderstood what I was saying though.
Issam al-Chalabi: Okay, can I just finish please, Dr. Marandi? What happened maybe during the Iraq-Iran war that some of the markers had been destroyed on the border there but then it's not that difficult. You have the maps, we have the coordinates, then simply ask for them and put them back again. It doesn't require forces from anybody.
Turning to violence, today Reuters notes a Baghdad sticky bombing has left three people (employed by an Iraqi MP) were injured, a Baghdad roadside bombing which injured four people (including three police officers) and, dropping back to Sunday, a Baghdad sticky bombing which wounded six people.
In the US, the Dept of Defense and the VA has put together a suicide prevention conference "held at the Hyatt Regency on Capital Hill, 400 New Jersey Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., on Jan. 11-13 from 8 a.m. -- 5 p.m. EST." This as Kimberly Hefling (AP) reports that the VA announced a 26% increase during the years 2005 through 2007 in veteran suicides.
Matthew Rothschild's guest on this week's The Progressive Radio Show is Nona Willis Aronowitz and I'm noting the non-Iraq related show because of her mother, the late Ellen Willis, who was a wonderful woman and a good friend. Nona's father is the noted left thinker Stanley Aronowitz who has a new piece at ZNet calling for people on the left to make a break from the forces that hold them back and suggesting "the starting point would be the left's clean break from the Democrats." Read the piece in full and, no, that's not a prankster impersonating Carl in the comments, he really is that much of a crackpot and a liar. Yes, the same Carl who helped for "Progressives" for Obama, the same Carl who injected himself into a Democratic Party primary is now attempting to claim otherwise. From his grave, Stalin watches in open-mouthed shock and admiration at Carl's continual efforts to revise his own personal history. Back to Nona, you can find out more about her writing at her website including the book she and Emma Bee Bernstein wrote Girldrive -- Criss-crossing America, Redefining Feminism.
We'll close with this from Debra Sweet's "Guantanamo Turns 8 While More Lives Slip Away" (World Can't Wait):Monday January 11 is the 8th anniversary of the U.S. detention center in Guantanamo. The emblematic symbol of the Bush regime's "war on terror," in which men have been openly tortured, kept in isolation, force-fed, and for years deprived of any legal respresentation or contact with the outside world, is still open.It's being called "Obama's prison" now. On January 22, 2009, the new president announced that he would close Guantanamo in a year because it's existence was a public relations nightmare for U.S. foreign policy makers. As of this week, there's no closing date, but a vague indication it could be closed in 2011.
Sweet also notes, "Protests of John Yoo on both ends of the country Tuesday, Jan. 12th! Fire, Disbar, and Prosecute War Criminal John Yoo! John Yoo, principal author of the "torture memos" justifying the Bush torture enterprise, is on a book tour, appearing on Jon Stewart's show (!) Monday night."
"
iraq
the guardianchris amesrichard norton-taylor
james coganwsws
sky news
robert dreyfussthe nation
press tv
nprmorning editionquil lawrence
al jazeera
inside iraq
jasim al-azzawi
the times of londonalice fordham
the world cant waitdebra sweet
matthew rothschild
Friday, January 08, 2010
The big news of the week
I thought it was just me at first but everyone trying to log into Blogger/Blogspot is having a problem. I tried logging in before the others at Trina's did which means I've been waiting longer but it also means that my page finally loaded and I can begin my entry. After over thirty minutes of waiting.
Yesterday (I don't blog on Thursdays), there was big news in the Iraq Inquiry. C.I. covered it in Thursday's Iraq snapshot and I found overseas coverage today but, within the US, there was no interest in it.
Explaining that if the British military had done what Nouri al-Maliki wanted done in Basra in 2008, "I would be sitting in front of a very different tribunal now," Lt. Gen. Barney White-Spunner sketched out Nouri as a man willing to punish his political rivals (such as the governor of the province) and untold civilians in the process.
It was very disturbing . . . except in the US where the media blacked out the story.
It reminded of what we are allowed to discuss and what we aren't. Even in 'independent' media. Take ZNet which started the week with a bit of propaganda from an Iraqi exile trying to turn a pan-Arab effort (the Ba'ath Party) into a CIA plot. Pan-Arab movements and Pan-Africa movements are not CIA efforts. I realize that a great deal of knowledge has been lost in the decades; however, pan-Arab and pan-African movements were specifically about those regions building up their own power and strength so that they could resist efforts at US control.
I am still shocked as to how that nonsense made it up at ZNet. I know Michael Albert and he know about movements very well so I have no idea why he posted that nonsense or allowed it to be posted.
They can and they will provide that but they won't provide us with the knowledge we need.
I also think about all the work C.I.'s done explaining and re-explaining the decision by Judge Ricardo Urbino in the case the Justice Department brought against the five Blackwater workers. I think about that and I just shake my head because how pathetic are we on the left if we don't support any judgment which says no to a runaway prosecution?
Is C.I. the only one with ethics?
Blackwater's not popular. Good. All the more reason to join C.I. in hailing the verdict.
We want the judges to make the unpopular decision. We certainly want it when it comes to those we decide are political prisoners in this country. Where do we get off not hailing Urbina's decision as a huge, huge victory?
It is a victory. He found prosecutorial misconduct on the part of the government and threw out the case as a result.
I applaud that anytime it happens and I do believe there are a few members of the Weather Underground who do as well because without that standard they would be behind bars.
We want a government that is forced to play by the rules.
We don't want a system where the government can break every rule but the defense has to play by the rules.
That's not justice.
Look back on the week and grasp that there was a great deal of big news but that you didn't hear about most of it unless you followed C.I.'s snapshots.
"Iraq snapshot" (The Common Ills):
Yesterday (I don't blog on Thursdays), there was big news in the Iraq Inquiry. C.I. covered it in Thursday's Iraq snapshot and I found overseas coverage today but, within the US, there was no interest in it.
Explaining that if the British military had done what Nouri al-Maliki wanted done in Basra in 2008, "I would be sitting in front of a very different tribunal now," Lt. Gen. Barney White-Spunner sketched out Nouri as a man willing to punish his political rivals (such as the governor of the province) and untold civilians in the process.
It was very disturbing . . . except in the US where the media blacked out the story.
It reminded of what we are allowed to discuss and what we aren't. Even in 'independent' media. Take ZNet which started the week with a bit of propaganda from an Iraqi exile trying to turn a pan-Arab effort (the Ba'ath Party) into a CIA plot. Pan-Arab movements and Pan-Africa movements are not CIA efforts. I realize that a great deal of knowledge has been lost in the decades; however, pan-Arab and pan-African movements were specifically about those regions building up their own power and strength so that they could resist efforts at US control.
I am still shocked as to how that nonsense made it up at ZNet. I know Michael Albert and he know about movements very well so I have no idea why he posted that nonsense or allowed it to be posted.
They can and they will provide that but they won't provide us with the knowledge we need.
I also think about all the work C.I.'s done explaining and re-explaining the decision by Judge Ricardo Urbino in the case the Justice Department brought against the five Blackwater workers. I think about that and I just shake my head because how pathetic are we on the left if we don't support any judgment which says no to a runaway prosecution?
Is C.I. the only one with ethics?
Blackwater's not popular. Good. All the more reason to join C.I. in hailing the verdict.
We want the judges to make the unpopular decision. We certainly want it when it comes to those we decide are political prisoners in this country. Where do we get off not hailing Urbina's decision as a huge, huge victory?
It is a victory. He found prosecutorial misconduct on the part of the government and threw out the case as a result.
I applaud that anytime it happens and I do believe there are a few members of the Weather Underground who do as well because without that standard they would be behind bars.
We want a government that is forced to play by the rules.
We don't want a system where the government can break every rule but the defense has to play by the rules.
That's not justice.
Look back on the week and grasp that there was a great deal of big news but that you didn't hear about most of it unless you followed C.I.'s snapshots.
"Iraq snapshot" (The Common Ills):
| Friday, January 8, 2009. Chaos and violence continue, the Iraq Inquiry hears that a military coup is possible in Iraq, Nouri's efforts to remain the new Saddam continue, Iran plans to resolve an oil well dispute by . . . building a fence, and more. John Jenkins: So on that basis, I would say that actually the professionalism of the armed forces is going up, and, to a certain extent, this must partly be because they have retained enough professional expertise and experience within their ranks to make that possible. You will also hear from people who say that this is a risk. It remains a risk by having people who have a Ba'athi background within the armed forces at senior levels, and I think one of the things we have seen since the -- the most recent spike in bombings in Baghdad, which started in August, have been renewed accusations that elements -- unreconciled elements of the Ba'ath Party, based externally, are deeply involved in these attacks and retain the will and the aspiration to re-emerge as a political force, as a sort of politically irredentist, a political force within Iraq. I find it very difficult to judge the force of those claims, but the conclusion I draw is that there is clearly a balance to be drawn between using professional competence and experience of former army officers under Saddam, to provide the backbone of the modern Iraqi security forces and dealing with the suspicions and fears of others, that this is the reintroduction of an element of the Ba'ath Party, unreconiclable elements of the Ba'ath Party, back into the security forces. I don't know how that balance is going to be struck. I don't know exactly what the balance at the moment is, what the reality of this is, but it is clearly a political issue inside Iraq and will remain a political issue beyond the national elections in March, I suspect. Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Going beyond the military, we heard from earlier witnesses how a lot of teachers, doctors, civil servants, competent professionals, who had to be in the Ba'ath Party in order to do what they did, were excluded. Do you feel that that has now been corrected? John Jenkins: I do not have a real sense of that. Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Do you want to comment on that? Frank Baker: If I could. I would comment more about government employees in Ministries across Baghdad where I think it is certainly the case that a large number of Sunnis, and, therefore, by definition, former Ba'ath Party members, are now being employed -- have been employed, in fact, for the last two or three years. If you look at, for example, the Ministry of Water, where a lot of them are technocrats, but the Minister for Water had made an effort to bring back a lot of the previous Ba'athist experience in order to try to get the Ministry up and running properly back in about 2007/2008. So I think the indications there are, yes, they have done so. I think, if I may, just to revert to your previous question about the democratisation, I think these two are related because on of the big changes we have seen since 2005 has actually been the re-emergence of the Sunnis as a political force in Iraq, with the Sunnis having essentially taken their toys out the pram and walked away. Back in 2004, not actually partaking in the 2005 provincial elections, not really being a part of the 2005 national elections, and, in fact, what we saw in 2009 was that they played a full part in that and they are going to play a full part in the national elections scheduled for March this year. In that sense, we are seeing the Sunnis now coming back and trying to play a full role -- a large part of the Sunni movement. Witnesses offer their take. They may be lying. They may be honest. On the latter, even when honest, it is their view and may be limited or grossly uninformed. Grossly uninformed would probably best describe Frank Baker who apparently doesn't pick up a newspaper. (As noted in yesterday's snapshot, Iraq is currently banning various political groups from participating in elections intended to take place in March). John Jenkins is England's current Ambassaodr to Iraq and Baker is their ambassador to Kuwait. Jenkins and Baker appeared before the Iraq Inquiry in London today offering joint-testimony and also appearing today was Peter Watkins (British Director of Operational Policy) (link goes to video and transcript options). We're done with Baker, obviously. Can't even read the morning paper, not much use in you. We'll instead note the following lengthy exchange: John Jenkins: I think there was a risk with the national elections in March that the turnout will be lower. Because I think it is still fragile, because I think -- having the habit of mind which sees democracy as something you actually have to work at is difficult and is not common at all in the Middle East. But I think this -- the way that politics has emerged as an alternative to the violent settling of disputes seems to be something that most Iraqis actually want. I think one of the turning points, one of the key -- if you can pinpoint what changed when was when Ayatollah Al-Sistani essentially said to people, "Vote. It is important that you vote". I think one of the lessons that the Shia in particular drew from what happened in the 1920s in Iraq is that they didn't actually participate in the process of conducting a modern state with the British mandated authority at the time. They were determined not to repeat this mistake and they concluded that, as the majority community in Iraq, it was, and is, in their interests to have a system that reflects their weight of numbers in the allocation of power at the centre. They also know that they need to bring along the other communities with them, the Sunnis and the Kurds. They know, I think -- or at least a substantial portion of them know -- that they can't do this by violence. You cannot impose this on the Sunnis. I think that in itself is a guarantee of the sustainability of some sort of democratic system in Iraq. How exactly over the next ten years this system will evolve and what sort of democratic system or accountable responsive system we will be looking at in ten year's time, I still find it quite difficult to predict, but they do have the institutions. They have the Council of Representatives, which is actually functioning pretty well, it passes laws, it has debates, but it doesn't have endless debates without passing anything which happens elsewhere in the Middle East where you have similar assemblies. It is not a done deal. It is not a done deal. If you look at the history of Iraq and the history of military coups in Iraq, you have to think that is always a possibility, a real possibility in the future, but I think where we are at the moment is -- it is much better than we thought it was going to be back in 2004/2005. Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Yes. I mean, obviously, if one goes back to early 2003, one of the stated objective of the leaders of the coalition was that, after Saddam Hussein, there should be democracy in Iraq, and there were people who argued, for precisely the reasons you have given, that this is a singular experience, unique experience in the Middle East and in Iraq's history, that this was simply not realistic. But what you call the democratisation agenda which is now being pursued, but with, as you say, some way to go and no certainty as to success, this is now a realistic agenda? John Jenkins: Yes, I believe it is. Committee Member Roderic Lyne: In the circumstances of today? John Jenkins: I believe it is. Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Can I ask you about de-Ba'athification? Yesterday, General White-Spunner was telling us how some of the Iraqi generals and commanders he was working with were people who had, as it were, been de-Ba'athified and then had come back into service. To what extent over the last two years/three years, since 2009, has there been a corrective to perhaps excessive de-Ba'athification under the CPA in 2003? Are people being rehabilitated on the basis of their abilities and merits now? John Jenkins: I'm told -- to be quite honest, I don't know how far this is true, but I am told that many of the senior officers, the generals in particular, in the Iraqi armed forces had -- have some sort of Ba'athi background or background in the Saddam armed forces. Now, of course, it is true that under Saddam, if you want to get on in the armed forces, you need to be a member of Ba'ath Party. Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Not just in the armed forces? John Jenkins: Not just in the armed forces. How far that is being done on the basis of merit, I don't know, is the answer to that. The people who deal most closely with the Iraqi security forces, which are the Americans, say that the standard -- the competence of the Iraqi armed forces is going up. They are getting better and there are elements within the security forces who are very good; elements who aren't so good, but elements who are good. [C.I. note: Next section is where we came in for this snapshot.] So on that basis, I would say that actually the professionalism of the armed forces is going up, and, to a certain extent, this must partly be because they have retained enough professional expertise and experince within their ranks to make that possible. You will also hear from people who say that this is a risk. It remains a risk by having people who have a Ba'athi background within the armed forces at senior leavels, and I think one of the things we have seen since the -- the most recent spike in bombings in Baghdad, which started in August, have been renewed accusations that elements -- unreconciled elements of the Ba'ath Party, based externally, are deeply involved in these attacks and retain the will and the aspiration to re-emerge as a poltical force, as a sort of politically irredentist, a political force within Iraq. I find it very difficult to judge the force of those claims, but the conclusion I draw is that there is clearly a balance to be drawn between using professional competence and experience of former army officers under Saddam, to provide the backbone of the modern Iraqi security forces and dealing with the suspicions and fears of others, that this is the reintroduction of an element of the Ba'ath Party, unreconcilable elements of the Ba'ath Party, back into the security forces. I don't know how that balance is going to be struck. I don't know exactly what the balance at the moment is, what the reality of this is, but it is clearly a political issue inside Iraq and will remain a political issue beyond the national elections in March, I suspect. From the above section, Richard Norton-Taylor (Guardian) emphasizes that a military coup is still "a real possibility". Alex Barker (Financial Times of London) also stresses that aspect. Surprisingly since this is what stood out to the press (those are just two examples), none latched upon Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's statements Wednesday. Huang Peizhao and Li Xiao (People's Daily Online) reported of Wednesday's remarks: On Wednesday, a military parade was held in Baghdad "Green Zone" of the unknown soldier monument to mark the 89th anniversary of the Iraqi Army Day. President Jalal Talabani and top military officers attended a ceremony and parade. In his speech delivered on the occasion, President Talabani stressed the need "to build a new Iraqi army with a defensive ideology", and the task of the military is "to protect the population and enforce security within its borders", "to defend the territorial integrity and state sovereignty" and to "fight terrorism". So it is the precondition to reshape Iraqi military for national security, social stability and peaceful environment in its post-war reconstruction, some analysts noted. According to regulations, a parliamentary election is planned for early March 2010, which represents a major part of the post-war reconstruction and a great event in the Iraq's political life. Whether this incoming national general election proceeds smoothly will determine whether or not Iraqi's future would be heading for stability. To this end, Talabani asked the armed forces to prepare for "escorting" the election at the same time appealing for general public to unite together to greet the election. Channel 4 News' Iraq Inquiry Blogger live blogs the hearings on Twitter and we'll note this Tweet on today's hearing: Good heavens - stenographer butts in and says she's been at it formore than two hours and she's had quite enough, thank you very much! Iraq Inquiry Blogger also explains, "Almost all the witnesses to date -- be they diplomatic, military or civilian -- were people charged with carrying out policies and intructions that had been decided upon by their political masters. From next week we'll also begin to start hearing from the politicians (and members of their innermost circles, eg Alastair Campbell next Tuesday) who took those decisions and created those policies." The issue of Iraqi women was raised by the committee. We'll note the following exchange: Committee Member Usha Prashar: My second question is about progress on issues to do with women because it was part of the constitution in 2005. Has there been any progress on that area or not? John Jenkins: In terms of representation of women nationally, I think there is quite a good story to tell actually. In terms of violence against women, I think this is a national issue in Iraq. We have seen, particularly in the north, in the KRG, a government which is prepared to do what it says it wants to do, which is to take action against honour killings, for example. I think you are dealing with -- and I think in Basra as well the intimidation of women by militias has stopped, and I think other people have said, you know, that actually one of the things the Charge of the Knights [Basra assault in 2008] did was reveal what we all thought, which was that most Basrawis didn't want this to happen, didn't want their lives disrupted, didn't want to be intimidated, didn't want their wives and daughters to be intimidated by the militias. I think -- and there were some very feisty Iraqi female members of Parliament, many of whom I have met. All have very distinctive ideas about how this should be pursued. Sustaining this, of course, is going to be -- like most things in Iraq is going to be a challenge, particularly when there are such strong counter-cultural currents. Committee Member Usha Prashar: So are you saying there has been a steady progress of women in the political process, in representation? John Jenkins: There has been progress. Whether this is -- steady? There has been progress. There has been progress, but I think now it will be -- the trick will be to make sure this continues. I think it is patchy, the way this has happened around the country. I think it is certainly easier to achieve -- to achieve progress in urban areas than it is in rural areas on this. On the subject of Iraqi women and Parliament, NPR's Quil Lawrence examined their participation as candidates in the expected elections on last Sunday's Weekened Edition (link has text and audio). Peter Watkins testimony focused primarily on the 2007 and beyond role for England in Iraq which includes the British military "providing naval assets alongside the Americans to help protect the oil platforms fromterrorist or whatever threats" and "which is providing officer training at the Iraqi military academy in Al Rustmiyah". Asked by Committee Member Martin Gilbert about Iraqi opinion of the continuing British role, Watkins responded, "My impression was the Iraqis were very keen for us to continue with both the naval training and the oil platform protection and, indeed, the officer training. I imagine the Iraqi military was keener on it than other, but there was not a strong divergence of views across the Iraqi system. They wanted us to continue with those roles." Defining the "Iraqi system" wasn't touched on (except by Committee Member Roderic Lyne much later), nor the populace's long expressed desire to have all foreign occupiers out of Iraq. The UN mandate -- authorizing the occupation, not the invasion (no UN mandate authorized the invasion) -- was touched on. It's still not understood clearly by a number of people (Raed Jarrar for example) which is why the US Status Of Forces Agreement is not understood. The chief player that didn't want the UN mandate (again) extended was Nouri al-Maliki. Peter Watkins: Basically, this was the part of the pattern of Iraq recovering its sovereignty. The Iraqis did not want UNSCR -- the UNSCR mandates to be extended beyond the end of December 2008. I think Prime Minister Maliki made that clear in his letter, which is attached to UNSCR 1790. They wanted to move to the position of a normal state. Watkins revealed that the government (Nouri in his counsel by the context of Watkins statement) wanted to do a blanket agreement for other countries continuing their role in Iraq after the SOFA passed the Iraqi Parliament November 27, 2008 and this was proposed; however, this lacked the support of "a number of Iraqi Parliamentarians, members of the Council of Representatives, that they should have been presented with an agreement which they would have seen as binding on both sides. [. . .] There was an increasing feeling that they wanted to have distinct agreements with each country, reflecting the specific roles of those countries." The British went with a Memo Of Understanding and, in Watkins discussions of that, he details how, without a new agreement (the ventual MOU), when the mandate ended, the British would have had to depart. That's basic but since the issue's been confused by the likes of Raed Jarrar, let's point out again that the US SOFA is a contract and can be terminated, can be extended or can be replaced with a new agreement. The same was true of the UN mandate. It could be extended (and was repeatedly), terminated (it was at the end of 2008) and replaced with something else (it was replaced, for the US, with the SOFA at the end of 2008). Iraqi objection to a foreign presence has long been documented. Roderic Lyne was the only committee member to raise the issue. Committee Membmer Roderic Lyne: So we wanted to do it, they want us to do it -- I suppose when you say "Iraqis", you mean particularly the leadership of the Iraqi Government, because clearly there are different points of view on the Iraqi side? Peter Watkins: The Iraqi Government wanted us to do it. It was clear, when Simon MacDonald and I went to Baghdad on 1 June to finalize the text, that they wanted to reach agreement. Turning to Nouri's attempts to ban political rivals, Nada Barki and Anthony Shadid (New York Times) note, "An Iraqi parliamentary committee moved Thursday to bar a Sunni Muslim lawmaker from national elections in March, outraging his supporters and threatening to worsen sectarian tension here. The lawmaker, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a prominent Sunni politician, and his group, the National Dialogue Front, were among those disqualified on the grounds of promoting the banned Baath Party of former President Saddam Hussein." Leila Fadel and Qais Mizher (Washington Post) observe, "The decision by the Justice and Accountability Commission, in charge of cleansing high-level Baathists from the ranks of the government and security forces, seemed to be an attempt to purge candidates with links to the old political order, many of whom are popular among secular nationalist voters. The move is a blow to hopes of bringing opposition figures -- who turned to violent resistance over the past seven years -- into the political fold, part of the U.S. strategy to bolster the government." But that's not really true. It's true for Sunnis -- "a blow to hopes of bringing opposition figures . . . into the political fold" -- but not of Shi'ites. Moqtada al-Sadr's militias were the focus of Nouri's ire in 2008, leading to the assault on Basra. They've been brought in. Nouri's worked overtime to bring the League of Righteous into the system. It appears that only the Sunnis are unwelcome. The League of Righteous, for example, not only attacked a US base and killed 5 US soldiers, they also kidnapped 5 British citizens and one remains missing. But that's not apparently a reason to keep them out of the political process. They still get face time with Nouri and his staff. Afif Sarhan (Islam Online) quotes Saleh al-Mutlak stating, "The government move just show how democracy is far from Iraq and clearly demonstrates a persecution from some other parties. The government will be surprised with the reaction they will get from Iraqis at the country's streets who are our supporters and conscious voters." Nada Barkri (New York Times) reports attempts to protest in the streets of Baghdad today were prevented by Iraqi security forces and quotes Diyala Province's Najim al-Harbi stating, "There is a great popular resentment toward this decision, which lacks any legal justification. The Iraqi street is now boiling." Doubt that it's just Sunnis being targeted? From Liz Sly's "Iraq bars major Sunni party from election" (Los Angeles Times): The Justice and Accountability Committee charged with checking that candidates don't have ties to Baathists has named Saleh Mutlak, a prominent lawmaker, among those disqualified from the elections, according to the panel's executive director, Ali Lami. That means that Mutlak's Iraqi Dialogue Front also will be barred, said Lami, who was detained by the U.S. military for a year on suspicion of ties to Iranian-backed militias. So you can be a Shi'ite, like Ali Lami, accused of ties to Iran and decide who will participate or not. You just can't have full participation if you're a Sunni. This isn't new and it's really not surprising. When a foreign government (the US) occupies a country and sets up a puppet government staffed with exiles from the country, the exiles are going to seek revenge. That's all that's happened in Iraq, that's the only real 'progress.' The Shi'ite exiles have extracted blood and vengance on various Sunnis -- some of whom wronged them previously, some of whom didn't. And they've made this extraction with US guns, tanks and air power to support them. The occupation was never supposed to be peaceful. That's why thugs were chosen to head the puppet government. You don't put blood thirsty exiles in charge of a country you want to 'heal.' You put thugs in charge so the entire populace lives in fear with the hope that they will be too cowed to object to the dances the puppets do for the occupying power. And, if you're Nouri, when the populace appears to have moved away from sectarian divides, you work to eliminate your political rivals who might do better than you in the upcoming election. Little Nouri is the new Saddam. He was put in charge by the US and he seeks blood and revenge. This was obvious in yesterday's public hearing of the Iraq Inquiry where British Lt Gen Barney White-Spunner explained that Nouri jumped the gun on a planned Basra operation by several months apparently due to the fact that the governor of the province was a political rival. Not only did that take place, but Nouri had no concern about the civilian population and wanted the British to willy-nilly bomb from the air which would have resulted in massive deaths. That's Little Nouri, the US thug chafing at his leash, ready to kill as soon as he's let off it. Al Jazeera notes of the move, "This year many Sunni Muslim political parties are expected to take part in the vote. But if al-Mutlaq is barred from the vote, it could lead to widespread Sunni unrest and disillusionment with the political process." Jason Ditz (Antiwar.com) explains, "Analysts warned that the move could lead to a broader boycott of the election among Sunnis and raise doubts about the nation's political stability." Turning to some of today's reported violence . . . Bombings? Reuters notes a Shirqat car bombing which injured seven people. Shootings? RTE News reports that 5 suspects were killed by US forces "in prolonged gunbattle that began Friday morning on the Mosul-Baghdad road, south of Mosul" and that another armed clash in Nineveh Province claimed 3 lives and leaving five injured. Last month, the world attempted to sort out competing claims (as oil prices soared) that Iran had or was occupying an Iraqi oil field. Iran denied the occupation and/or insisted that it was Iran's oil field anyway. Iraq insisted the occupation was taking place and that it was Iraq's oil fields. Some residents of neighboring areas stated that the occupation had taken place weeks before the press reported it and that it was now over. Alice Fordham (Times of London) reports that Hoshyar Zebari (Iraq's Foreign Minister) met with Manouchehr Mottaki (Iran's Foreign Minister) in Baghdad to address the Fakka oil field: "Both ministers indicated after the meeting that they had not been able to resolve the ownership of the parts of Fakka oil field disputed since the 1988 end of the Iran-Iraq war, nor had they agreed on a version of what happened in the incursion. Mr Zebari said that after 'direct action' was taken by the Iraqi Government the Iranian flag was lowered at the site, while Mr Mottaki said that the Iraqi side might have been partly to blame." The Tehran Times reports that the two reached "important agreements for resolving the disputes over their borders" and that Iran would build a fence to settle the Fakka oil field dispute. UPI observes today, 'If Iran took control of the southern fields it, rather than Iraq, would surpass Saudi Arabia, its Sunni-dominated regional rival." Mike noted the meeting of the two ministers yesterday and how Jalal Talabani, Iraqi president, appeared to be going strangely out of his way to suck up to Iran. In the US, despite three callers raising the issue of Iraq on today's second hour of The Diane Rehm Show (NPR), Iraq was not a topic for discussion. Martin Walker jumped on one issue raised by a caller for sentence or two to take the conversation where he wanted (Pakistan). He did not, however, address Iraq. He did float, wrongly, the notion that there is uproar in the Arab World (however that's defined) over Judge Ricardo Urbina's decision in the recent Blackwater case. Naturally, Walker couldn't explain the decision because his who point of existance is apparently to inflame. Judging by the callers, MSNBC's night time talk show hosts are among the ones putting out this talking point. Reality, none of those three are reporters, none of the three speak Arabic. The Arab speaking world, judging by Arabic publications, is not 'inflamed' at the US over the decision. To believe that requires a lot of ignorance and bigotry on the part of the person making the assumption. The Arab speaking world is not a dunce or an idiot. They are as highly intelligent as any other society, they have the same number of less than on the ball people. They're not 'the other' or strange or stunted. The Baghdad shooting took place in September 2007. Over two years later, a decision is not going to 'inflame' them. They're not going to be up in arms because there was never a strong feeling that, if proven guilty, Blackwater would be held accountable. The Arab speaking world is not unaware of the close governmental ties Blackwater had with the previous administration and the current administration. There's anger expressed at the US and anger expressed at Nouri al-Maliki whose grandstanding on the issue has not gone over well (due to the fact that Nouri did nothing on this issue and contractors still remain in Iraq). As someone who can read Arabic, the 'inflamation' allegedly being seen today was present . . . when Steven D. Green received a life sentence and not the death penalty. That outrage was due to the fact that Green didn't deny raping and killing Abeer or killing her parents and her younger sister. His 'defense' was all about not denying the charges. So when he walked -- on a charge that would have resulted in death in many MidEast countries -- it did create an outrage. That outrage was more akin to the outrage over Abu Ghraib (though it never reached the same intensity), the Blackwater decision, judging by Arab language media, is not like either and much of the anger is aimed at Nouri. In the US, Philip J. Crowley handled today's State Dept briefing. He gave lip service to "respect the rule of law" but mainly bobbed and weaved. One such moment was when he was told that the State Dept was late in responding to an incident that took place last year -- referring to Urbina's verdict. Crowley appeared dazed and not to grasp the word play there -- the decision was announced December 31, 2009. So while it was 'last week,' it was also 'last year.' But he was taken aback and apparently unable to process that fact. He was given the following numbers: 120,000 military contractors in Iraq and 130,000 to 132,000 US troops as of summer 2009. He was asked if this said anything about Iraq's so-called sovereignty? Philip J. Crowley: I don't have -- I can't verify those numbers. I think there have been some GAO numbers more recently, I think, that puts your numbers well below. I mean, contractors play an important role in any significant operation anywhere in the world, whether it's a military operation, whether it's a humanitarian operation. And it is something that we are going to see in the future. The real issue is -- is what are they doing, how are they doing it, how are they integrating. In the case of Iraq, how well are the operations of the contractors integrated within military operations. In other cases, how well are they integrated within the institutions within specific countries. November 2, 2009, the Commission on Wartime Contracting was told by the GAO's William Solis that, as of the end of August, there were 128,700 US service members "spread aong 295 bases throughout the country." This despite the fact that the US press had reported 115,000 and 110,000 for the bulk of 2009. Philip J. Crowley: But nonetheless, I think it's safe to say that in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in other places, contractors will have a role to play and a valuable role to play. But we are looking to make sure that not only their role is appropriate but that where they are there, they have effective oversight, they're fulfilling the terms of their contract, and they're held accountable when things go wrong. Asked whether or not US contractors might remain in Iraq even if a US withdrawal (of "armed forces") took place, Crowley responded: It could be a little bit of both. I mean, you have a transition here where, in fact, once we get through the election in early March in Iraq, we will -- working closely with the Government of Iraq and following the strategic agreement that we have with Iraq, we'll begin to transform our relationship. Military forces will withdraw over time. That will have some impact on contractors who are there to primarily support our military presence in Iraq. More of the effort will shift from the military component to the civilian component. We may well have contractors at the State Department, for example, who will continue to function in Iraq to help Iraq itself build institutions of government. But over time, more of this activity will shift from being a U.S. responsibility to being an Iraqi responsibility. Back to The Diane Rehm Show. As Ruth's "E.P.A. pressures Diane Rehm not to cover mountaintop mining" explained last night, Diane's attempt to cover mountaintop coal mining on Thursday's first hour resulted in objections from the governmental agency. Diane Rehm: And before we begin, let me tell you that we did contact the E.P.A., invite them to take part in the show. A spokesman said that their work with Hobet mine resulted in Hobet being able to gather more coal, it resulted in 50% less impact on the streams. The spokesman stressed that the E.P.A. does not have the power to stop the practice of mountaintop mining. The spokesman also expressed annoyance with our covering the subject of mountain top mining without giving the E.P.A., whom we contacted yesterday morning, sufficient time to respond. And let me be sure to say to all of our listeners, our subject matters for the next day's show are always decided 24 hours in advance. TV notes, NOW on PBS begins airing on most PBS stations tonight (check local listings) and this week's program explores the Afghanistan War: President Obama is sending as many as 30,000 more troops to combat Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan this year, but are we missing the true target? On Friday, January 8 at 8:30 pm (check local listings), NOW reports directly from Pakistan's dangerous and pivotal border with Afghanistan, where Pentagon war planners acknowledge many of the enemy fighters and their leaders are based. The U.S. has been relying on Pakistan to act against Taliban militants there, but the Pakistani army's commitment is in question. NOW takes you to the true front lines for an eye-opening, inside lookyou haven't seen before, and won't soon forget. And NOW on PBS has posted video online of Pakistan forces fighting the Taliban as a preview for Friday's show. Washington Week begins airing on many PBS stations tonight (and throughout the weekend, check local listings) and joining Gwen are Peter Baker (New York Times), James Barnes (National Journal), Ceci Connolly (Washington Post) and Tom Gtelten (NPR) who fortunately won't be able to laugh at listeners who call in since this isn't a radio show. Meanwhile Bonnie Erbe will sit down with Debra Carnahan, Avis Jones-DeWeever and Leslie Sanchez to discuss the week's events on PBS' To The Contrary. Check local listings, on many stations, it begins airing tonight. And turning to broadcast TV, Sunday CBS' 60 Minutes offers: Watching The Border Steve Kroft reports on the status of the multi-billion-dollar "virtual fence" being built at the U.S.-Mexican border, which is years behind schedule and so far covers only about one percent of the border. Revelations From The Campaign Authors of a new book, "Game Change," and John McCain's former top campaign strategist reveal behind-the-scenes issues from the Republican and Democratic camps during the presidential campaign. CNN's Anderson Cooper reports. Watch Video Resurrecting The Extinct Scientists believe they can sustain endangered species - maybe even one day resurrect some that have died out - using DNA technology. Lesley Stahl reports. Watch Video 60 Minutes, Sunday, Jan. 10, at 7 p.m. ET/PT. |
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