This is nonsense.
Valerie Bertinelli buy a damn clue.
You made your second husband your show. Then you turned on him and you trashed him.
You said vicious and hideous things about him. You're the one who brought him on your show.
Remember when Burt Reynolds and Loni Anderson broke up? America didn't want to hear all of Burt Reynold's bitching. We didn't want to hear your bitching either, Valerie. We were also aware that you had step-children in this marriage and the trash you said about their father was being heard by them.
That's why FOOD NETWORK viewers turned on you. Trina covered this in real time at her site. She plugged your show like crazy. Then you started this bitching spiral and she calmly responded that it wasn't appropriate. You got worse, much worse. Trina couldn't watch you anymore and she started getting e-mails from others about how they couldn't take your program anymore.
No one forced you to bring your second husband (and his family) on your program. But you did. Then you looked like a damn liar afterwards when you started attacking him.
Here you are crying that THE FOOD NETWORK doesn't want you anymore. You made viewers dislike you. Your online cult is not a reflection of the world. It's a reflection of your fans. But the number of fans you have it not enough to justify you having a program on THE FOOD NETWORK. You once were able to deliver an audience but you ruined that yourself.
One more thing, you weren't Eddie Van Halen's widow. A lot of people got ticked off as you tried to play that role. Especially when they found out that Eddie had an actual widow.
From Kat's "Okay, so I'm griping about Valerie Bertinelli" back in 2022:
Exactly. You destroyed your own chance to be on THE FOOD NETWORK. Stop crying like a baby, grow up and find some self-respect.
"Iraq snapshot" (THE COMMON ILLS):
There was a lot of detail there. Here are the provisional measures the court has made:
- 1. Israel must take all measures to prevent any acts that could be considered genocidal - killing members of a group, causing bodily harm, inflicting conditions designed to bring about the destruction of a group, preventing births
- 2 Israel must ensure its military does not commit any genocidal acts
- 3 Israel must prevent and punish any public comments that could be considered incitement to commit genocide in Gaza
- 4 Israel must take measures to ensure humanitarian access
- 5 Israel must prevent any destruction of evidence that could be used in a genocide case
- 6 Israel must submit a report to the court within one moth of this order being given
The court also expressed grave concern about the fate of hostages being held by Hamas and called for their immediate release.
AMY GOODMAN: We begin today’s show in Gaza, where the death toll continues to climb and Israel’s relentless assault continues. At least 20 Palestinians were killed today and 150 injured as they were lining up for humanitarian aid in Gaza City, this according to the Palestinian Health Ministry, with the number of casualties expected to rise.
The attack comes one day after a crowded U.N. shelter housing tens of thousands of displaced Palestinians in Khan Younis was struck on Wednesday, setting the building on fire. At least 12 people were killed, over 75 wounded, when two tank shells hit the site, according to the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, known as UNRWA. The Israeli military, the only actor on the ground that has tanks, denied it carried out the strike.
Meanwhile, the Israeli army has surrounded and isolated the two main hospitals in Khan Younis, Nasser and al-Amal, stranding hundreds of patients and thousands of displaced people inside, that again according to UNRWA. A third hospital was evacuated overnight.
In recent days, thousands more Palestinians have rushed to escape further south, crowding into shelters and tent camps near the border with Egypt. Over 1.7 million people have been displaced in Gaza, and more than 25,000 have been killed in Israel’s assault over the past three months.
We go now to Rafah, where we’re joined by Akram al-Satarri, a journalist who’s been covering developments on the ground. He’s joining us from just outside the Yousef al-Najjar Hospital in Rafah, the southernmost city in Gaza.
Akram, welcome back to Democracy Now! Can you describe what’s happening in Rafah and the reports of what’s happening in Khan Younis?
AKRAM AL-SATARRI: Well, the situation in Khan Younis is aggravating in such a very serious way. The bombardment and the targeting around the hospitals that you have just mentioned — al-Amal Hospital in Khan Younis, in the Khan Younis al-Amal neighborhood; Al-Khair Hospital, that was stormed by the Israeli occupation forces, and people there who are staff were interrogated, and people who are internally displaced people were arrested. Nasser Hospital has been the subject to some massive attacks, and some of those attacks targeted also UNRWA-designated shelters that are located in the immediate vicinity of the Nasser Hospital. The clinic, the UNRWA clinic that is in the heart of Khan Younis refugee camp, was — the area of its vicinity was also targeted.
People were asked to leave their homes. And some of the people who were leaving their homes were reporting about a journey of horror, devastation and imminent death that they have been seeing. They have been reporting about them seeing the people who are dead on the ground, without anyone daring to reach them or to collect their bodies or to try to extend a helping hand for the people who are screaming for help because of their lethal and bloody injuries.
The KYTC, that is run by the UNRWA, and that is also recognized by Israel as a designated shelter and protected shelter, was targeted once again. And now people who are staying in there, who are in thousands, are asked by the Israeli occupation to move from that area towards Rafah area in the very south, which means that there is more targeting underway, which means that they would be afraid and the ones who were killed and injured who were taken to Rafah rather than to Khan Younis because of the fact that the Israeli occupation closed the way between Khan Younis coastal area and Khan Younis refugee camp and Khan Younis downtown. So the situation is aggravating in that way. Hundreds of people are injured. Tens of people are killed.
Also, not far away from Khan Younis, in Gaza City, the people who were waiting in al-Kuwait roundabout were targeted. They were waiting for the humanitarian assistance because the situation in Gaza City and the north is extremely dire. People are already suffering from famine, very lacking situation when it comes to the food supplies and drinkable water. They’re waiting there. Twenty — as you said, 20 were killed, 150 others were injured. The new about this report is that among those 150, there is a very large number of people who are sustaining very critical, life-threatening injuries and who might be reported as killed, which means the number of victims of this bloody attack is expected to rise significantly in the coming hours.
So, the situation continues to feature large-scale bombardment in Khan Younis, displacement of people, destroying of whole blocks and houses, people moving, and they end up targeted when they are moving. Designated shelters that are supposed to be protected, now the people in them are asked to be IDPs once again, given that the IDPs in that area are coming mainly from the north, people who moved from the north to Gaza City, then moved from Gaza City to Gaza central area, then moved from Gaza central area to Khan Younis area. And then, from Khan Younis, they moved to the KYTC, and they are now asked for the fifth or sixth time to leave the area that they were seeking safety in, and to move in a very unsafe path towards the unknown in southern Gaza, in Rafah, which the targeting is still continuous. Number of people who are killed in Rafah is still increasing. And the Gazans, at large, are not aware what the future holds of them, with the number of IDPs reaching 1.9 million Gazans in all different areas, including the coastal area in Khan Younis and the already heavy-populated area in Rafah.
AMY GOODMAN: ”IDP” is, of course, internally displaced people. Akram, if you can describe the telecommunications blackout and the effect it has on people trying to communicate with each other, find each other, get to hospitals, reporting of injuries? And also, I don’t take for granted that we’re able even to speak to you today in Rafah, in Gaza. And if you can talk about how you both report and take care of your own family?
AKRAM AL-SATARRI: Well, if I may speak from a very personal perspective, I personally was under that imminent threat of death in Khan Younis. I lost communication with my family, with my sister, with my nephews and nieces who lost their father. I lost contact with my son. I was wondering how can I possibly survive under the imminent threat of fire.
And when I say an imminent threat of fire and death, I mean that seven people were targeted at the door of our home, the home that was hosting us. And the seven people, no one ambulance could reach them. We were trying to call 111, which is the ambulance services — sorry, 101, which is the ambulance services. We could not get through to them.
The communication blackout looks — it looks like it was intentional for the sake of cutting all communication and cutting the coverage and trying to keep Gaza isolated from the world and keep Gaza voiceless at the time that the Israeli occupation was developing the ground operation and was targeting the different areas in Khan Younis and throughout the Gaza Strip. I lost communication, and I was — and am still — facing significant challenges reporting, moving. And you never know. When you are just driving a car or just driving a taxi, or just even riding an animal-pulled cart, you don’t know whether they are going to target someone who’s walking down the street, someone who’s next to you on that animal-pulled cart, or maybe they would target you. So, it’s very difficult to understand in Gaza what’s coming next. It’s very difficult to predict who they are going to target. It’s very difficult to predict why they are targeting people.
But the bottom line, and the conclusion that we see with our own eyes, that the targeting is thorough, the destruction is larger than ever, and the suffering of the people because of that ongoing policy is unconceivable, unconceivable in the sense that I personally had to move and see the people who are dead and to try to move, and while five or six other houses around me were targeted, while I could see the artillery fire taking out whole house when I was moving in the Khan Younis area and was staying in the area that I was waiting for the situation to be a little bit safer to move, but it turned out the situation was getting from bad to worse, and the targeting was getting heavier. I was staying in the area that is called 111 area, which is a block that was designated by Israel as a safe area. And across from our area was 112 block. But the bombardment was in 111, 112, 107, 48, 86. All the blocks were targeted all at once. And that ground operation seemed to be indiscriminately sending death and destruction all over the area.
So, with that comes, as you have just said, the struggle to survive, to struggle to stay sane under this ever-escalating situation and to look for one minute of peace. I was personally thinking just yesterday that we are wanting some one second of rest and peace, even if that means we would die, even if that means they would take us, even if that means they take our life for the sake of just keeping us peaceful.
So, this is how it unfolded in Gaza, and this is how it continues to unfold. People are dying. People are scared. People are displaced. And they think they are even uprooted intentionally and there is an eradication attempt that is taking place in Gaza. The Israeli occupation has been targeting every single corner in Khan Younis. Khan Younis refugee camp, that is extremely populated and overcrowded, was targeted. When you target one house in one specific area, that means you are likely to affect around 20 to 30 houses, because the areas are very narrow, and the space, that is limited for every house. And targeting one place, explosion in one place means that this explosion, the implication of that explosion, would reach — or, the secondary wave of the explosion would reach around 20 to 30 houses.
AMY GOODMAN: Did you know the reporters that were killed most recently? I mean, the numbers are just astonishing. The Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders are all decrying the number, ranging between 80 and 120. But the latest killing of journalists, for example, Wael al-Dahdouh’s son, Hamza al-Dahdouh — did you know Mustafa Thuraya? Did you — I know that Wael has just gotten out of Gaza. He’s head of the —
AKRAM AL-SATARRI: I think we lost the connection.
AMY GOODMAN: — Al Jazeera — and he has now been operated on in Qatar. He’s now at Al Jazeera headquarters. His cameraman, Samer Abudaqa, who died in the attack. These reporters, were they friends of yours?
I think we have just lost Akram. Absolutely amazing that we were able to maintain that length of time in speaking to him in Gaza. He was speaking to us from Rafah. Akram al-Satarri is a Gaza-based journalist, joining us from southern Gaza.
This is Democracy Now! When we come back, Palestinian tax revenue, Israel is refusing to release it but has made an agreement with Norway to hold it in escrow. What’s happening to Palestinians’ money? We’ll speak with a leading economist in Ramallah. Stay with us.
Al Jazeera on Thursday published the latest update to its "Know Their Names" project, identifying some of the thousands of children killed so far in what people around the world are increasingly calling Israel's genocidal war on the Gaza Strip.
Produced by Mohammed Haddad and Mohammed Hussein, the project now lists 4,216 Palestinians, from infants to 17-year-olds. Of those named, 75% hadn't even lived to their teens, more than half were under age 10, and nearly 500 were younger than 2.
The children are sorted by age, with notes about each group: 17-year-olds "lived through four wars (2008-09, 2012, 2014, 2021)" only to be killed in the fifth and 10-year-olds had their "lives ended before adolescence," while 4-year-olds were "deprived of the joys of preschool" and at least 258 babies "didn't reach their first birthday."
Al Jazeera noted that "the Gaza Strip is a graveyard for thousands of children, the United Nations has said. Since October 7, Israeli attacks have killed at least 10,000 children, according to Palestinian officials. That is one Palestinian child killed every 15 minutes, or about one out of every 100 children in the Gaza Strip."
Officials in Gaza said later Thursday that at least 25,900 people—including 11,500 children—have been killed and another 64,110 injured in Israel's bombardment and blockade, launched in retaliation for a Hamas-led attack. Israeli forces have devastated civilian infrastructure and displaced most of the enclave's 2.3 million residents.
Accounting for the thousands of people missing and presumed dead under the rubble in Gaza, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor puts the child death toll at 13,022.
Among the dead is 12-year-old Dunia Abu Mohsen, who previously lost a leg in an Israeli airstrike. Before she was killed last month by an Israeli tank-fired shell that hit al-Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis, she said in a video interview that "I want someone to take me abroad, to any country, to install a prosthetic leg, to be able to walk like other people."
"I want to become a doctor, like those who treat us, so that I can treat other children," she said in the recording shared by Defense for Children International - Palestine. "I only want one thing: for the war to end."
An 11-year-old girl in Rafah told the humanitarian group Save the Children earlier this month that "the war has affected us so badly. We had to leave our homes and couldn't do anything. We learned many things during the war, like how important it is to save water. I hope the war ends, and we live in peace and safety."
+ Americans on whether Israel’s devastation of Gaza constitutes genocide:
Agree: 35%
Disagree: 36%
Undecided: 29%Among 2020 Biden voters:
Agree: 50%
Disagree: 20%
Undecided: 30%
(Economist/YouGov)
+ So half of Biden Democrats (and half of all young Americans) believe Israel is committing genocide, the Economist poll shows. These poll numbers won’t suddenly begin climbing upward for Biden, even if they start killing a bunch of Somali, Houthi, Syrian and Iraqi kids to show Americans it’s not just Palestinian kids he despises, which seems to be his plan….
The U.S. and Iraq will begin formal talks in coming days that officials say could lead to the eventual withdrawal of American troops in the country, a major milestone in the years-long effort by the two countries to fight the Islamic State.
The decision to move forward with the discussions, known as the Higher Military Commission, comes just days after Iranian-backed forces in Iraq launched a barrage of missiles on a U.S. base, injuring at least four service members and one Iraqi.
(Dec. 7, 2016) On November 26, 2016, the Iraqi Parliament institutionalized the people’s fighting forces known as Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Popular Mobilization (PM), by passing a special law on the matter. (Law of the Popular Mobilization Authority (2016 Law), Iraqi Parliament website (Nov. 26, 2016) (in Arabic).)
Under the new law, the PM is an independent organization with corporate personality, is a part of the Iraqi armed forces, and reports directly to the general commander of the armed forces. (Id. art 1.1.) The PM is subject to all military laws in effect except those related to age and education requirements. (Id. art 1.2.1.) Members of the PM must be disengaged from all political, partisan, and social organizations, and no political activity by those members is permitted. (Id. art 1.2.5.) The commander of the PM will be appointed with the approval of the Parliament. (Id. art 2.)
The 2016 law replaces an executive order on the PM issued earlier this year by the Prime Minister, Haider al-Ibadi, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. (Order No. 91 (Feb. 2, 2016), IKH NEWS (July 26, 2016) (in Arabic).)
MODERATOR: Today's briefing is on background, which means that you may refer to and attribute comments from our briefers as a Senior Defense Official, Senior State Official, and Senior Military Official, respectively. This briefing will run for approximately 30 minutes. We'll start with opening statements and then turn to questions. We do ask that you keep to one question out of professional respect for others' desires to ask questions. And again, this is an on-background briefing.
And with that, we'll start with our Senior Defense Official.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Good morning or good afternoon, everybody. Thanks for joining us.
During the August 2023 U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue, the JSCD, between the Department of Defense and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the United States committed to launch the Higher Military Commission, the HMC, with our Iraqi partners on a mutually determined date. Today is the date that the Secretary of Defense and his Iraqi counterpart have announced the launch of the HMC.
Before I get into the details on the HMC, I want to reflect on how we've arrived at this point in the campaign to defeat ISIS. Nearly 10 years ago, the United States began working with allies and partners to confront the urgent threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
At its height, ISIS controlled more than 100,000 square kilometers of territory containing more than 11 million people. ISIS attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters from multiple nations to Iraq and Syria. It used its territory as a safe haven to plot and stage attacks across the region and the globe.
ISIS committed numerous atrocities and abuses, including those involving persecution of individuals and entire communities on the basis of their identity, kidnapping of civilians, forced displacement, killing and maiming of children, rape, and other forms of sexual violence.
Faced with this threat to our mutual security and shared values, together, the United States, with its allies and partners, formed Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, CJTF-OIR, and over the past decade, CJTF-OIR has removed ISIS from the territory it once controlled.
The partnership between CJTF and OIR and the government of Iraq has been a decisive factor in the defeat of ISIS, and the Iraqi Security Forces, the ISF, have been in the lead during the last several years of the campaign to defeat ISIS with CJTF-OIR in support to advise, assist, and enable our partner forces. The ISF have made tremendous progress through cooperation with CJTF-OIR.
10 years after the Iraqi government invited the United States and the rest of the coalition to fight ISIS and seven years after our collective territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq, we see a need to transition to a normal bilateral security cooperation relationship.
And so that's the background for the announcement today of the launch of the HMC. As I said, the HMC is not new. It's a due out of the inaugural JSCD, which built upon previous strategic bilateral discussions on our mutual commitment to security cooperation and shared interests in regional stability.
These discussions include the July 2021 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Dialogue, the July 2021 U.S.-Iraq Military Technical Talks, the February 2023 U.S.-Iraq Higher Coordinating Committee, and as I mentioned, the August 2023 U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue.
The HMC process aims to determine how the coalition's military mission will evolve on a timeline according to the following factors — the threat from ISIS, operational and environmental requirements, and capability levels of the Iraqi Security Forces.
The HMC will consist of expert working groups focused on the three mutually determined factors I mentioned and will be led by military and defense professionals who will guide the discussion about the natural and necessary evolution of the D-ISIS Coalition mission while ensuring that ISIS can never resurge. The HMC will be led by U.S. and Iraqi delegations, in close consultation with coalition partners every step of the way.
Let me be clear — the HMC meeting is not a negotiation about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. The United States and the coalition are in Iraq at the invitation the Iraqi government to fight ISIS. Our Iraqi partners have assured us of their commitment toward working together to shape this future U.S. military presence and ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
Both nations remain committed to security cooperation and our shared interest in regional stability. The United States and Iraq will continue to work together to shape future U.S. military presence and ensure an Iraqi-led enduring defeat of ISIS.
So I'll — with that, I'll stop there and turn it over to my colleagues.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll now hear from our Senior State Official.
SENIOR STATE OFFICIAL: Thank you. The HMC is another facet in the development of the broader U.S. and Iraq relationship. As my colleague in OSD mentioned, it's an outcome of the inaugural JSCD last August, which came after a host of other discussions, including the various dialogues that he mentioned.
All of those dialogues, they build upon previous bilateral discussions and fall within the spirit of our 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq. These discussions focused not only on our security elements, but on issues that extend well beyond the security partnership with Iraq. They have helped us advance our full 360-degree partnership with Iraq across a range of issues, including energy, finance, climate, water and trade, among many others. So the HMC builds on this effort with the shared goal of transitioning to an enduring bilateral security partnership between Iraq and the United States. Over.
MODERATOR: Thank you. And then lastly, we'll hear from our senior military official.
Sir?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hello, team. This is your senior military official from Baghdad, Iraq. And just to amplify a little bit about what we're about and our purpose, I command the 24 nations and their contributions to this Coalition Joint Task Force and the mission of Operation Inherent Resolve. There are, as a reminder, over 80 nations involved in the global coalition to defeat ISIS, and we are in constant communication with their supporting efforts, as well.
A reminder that we are here at the invitation of the government of Iraq and remain steadfast partners in that effort.
We really focus on just two things as part of my mission: it's the enduring defeat of Daesh, or ISIS, and it's the advise-assistant-enable missions that we have with our partner forces, primarily the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Security Forces, and some of those Special Operations units that they both have.
Now, we look at the enduring defeat of Daesh and the three components as a reminder: the Daesh at large in Iraq and Syria, the Daesh in detention, of which there's less than 10,000 in detention facilities in Syria, and then there's the displaced persons at camps such as al-Roj and al-Hol that have about 2,000 and about 44,000 displaced persons at this time.
The at-large Daesh is where we partner with our forces to either capture or kill the Daesh before they can cause or create other operations against our forces or against the civilian population.
In detention and with displaced persons, our mission function is in the repatriation process of them back to their host countries for either justice and rule of law for detainees or reintegration/rehabilitation for those who are displaced persons, and that's important. If there were to be a prison breakout, Daesh could become operational overnight with 2,000 prisoners being — could escape and become part of an operational force, and that is Daesh's operational goal right now.
In the displaced persons camps, that's a recruitment potential with the children and the brides of ISIS fighters who are in detention or who were killed. And so our goal is to get them back home to reintegrate and rehabilitate to society and give those children a chance.
At A2E, we partner with the Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish Security Forces with non-lethal support. A reminder that my mission is not a combat mission. We have force protection capabilities and have had to use those, as you are aware, since the attacks began upon our formations October 18th to this day by some of the, what I would term, outlaw militias here in Iraq.
The HMC is a process that we are beginning very soon, and as discussed, it was defined and outlined in the outline minutes of the JSCD in August, and there are functional working groups that we've created, along with our Iraqi partners, mil-to-mil to make sure we discuss along those factors the state of the Iraqi Security Forces, the state of Daesh and the state of the operational environment. Again, not a timeline-driven event; factors-based, and so we will govern that process with our dialogue together.
And pending your questions, that's our opening statement from Baghdad. Thank you.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, and with that, we'll start with Associated Press, Tara Copp.
Q: Hi. Thank you, everyone, for doing this. I wanted to ask about a timetable, because the Iraqi Foreign Ministry put out a statement shortly after the secretary did saying that this — these discussions will formulate, quote, "a specific and clear timetable about the reduction of advisers in Iraq." So if we could just talk about, what does that mean for the U.S. troops? Would there be a reduction from the 2,500? And — or is there some sort of disconnect between what the U.S. is seeing will happen here and what Iraq will see? And then secondly, what about, for the coalition — for coalition members, is this U.S. only, or will this also mean an eventual reduction of all coalition members? Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is the senior defense official. We're just not able at this time to provide any kind of specific timelines for HMC process itself, or for a date of the eventual transition of CJTF-OIR. All of that is pending discussions between the HMC expert working groups during the initial stage of the process. Any discussion of mission transition in Iraq will be factors-based, as my colleague has stated.
We're committed, along with our Iraqi partners and our coalition partners, to carefully revisit the question of timing and to ensuring that the HMC is comprehensive, efficient and a professional process. But at this time, that's the most we can say about it.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Next, we'll go to Jared Zuba with Al Monitor.
Q: Hi, all. Thank you for doing this. You mentioned that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq is at the invitation of the Iraqi government. Going forward, if the Iraqi government requests that the U.S.-led coalition depart the country, you know, on a certain timeline, assuming that the U.S. will comply, how do you intend to support continued presence and operations of Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria? And do you see a sustained CJTF-OIR presence in Syria after a potential withdrawal from Iraq, or at least, from parts of Iraq? Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I'll start. This is senior defense official, and perhaps, our senior military official will chime in.
There are a lot of hypotheticals built into your question which we just really aren't going to be able to address. As I said, the discussion about any eventual transition of OIR will be undertaken within the HMC process, but there's no way for us to forecast exactly where that leads or on what timetable that leads, and therefore, how it affects other aspects of Operation Inherent Resolve are kind of derivative hypotheticals of the first, so I don't think I'm going to address it any further.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: And this is the senior military official in Baghdad. What I can amplify to it is as agreed to, the process is driven to an outcome for an eventual bilateral relationship for — you asked about the coalition contributions — those member nations in a bilateral relationship with the government of Iraq, and same with the United States government and the United States military, as we do with other countries in the region and around the globe. That third-factor working group is kind of the catch-all, if you will, that would encompass potential transition formations and what the government of Iraq would like in that relationship going forward.
And that's a matter of policy, and that is not something we've been determined or has been directed, but it's part of the discussions we'll have as part of the HMC process. Over?
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll go to Wall Street Journal's Michael Gordon.
Q: Thank you. You've mentioned that the goal is to transition eventually, at some point, to a bilateral relationship. My question is, could this bilateral relationship, whenever it occurs, include the presence of US military advisers to assist the Iraqi security forces?
And also, administration officials have been saying in recent weeks that they didn't want to initiate the higher military commission process under the point of a gun while the U.S. forces were under attack by these Iranian-backed militias. But that seems to be exactly what you're doing.
Why did you change your stance on the timing of beginning these talks?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is the senior defense official. To the first question, you know, Iraq remains a critical security partner to the United States. We've been engaged in the D-ISIS fight side by side with Iraqi security forces since the D-ISIS coalition mission began 10 years ago. We're going to continue this strong security partnership to advance our shared objectives and interests.
The HMC will help us determine what form that partnership will take. Iraqi stability and sovereignty are essential for regional peace and security. That's what we're there to support.
Regarding the timing of the HMC, it's not connected to recent events. As it was mentioned a couple of times, this was agreed to — this was a commitment made in the August 2023 Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue. The attacks, recent attacks from the Iran-aligned militia groups in the U.S. and coalition — against U.S. and coalition personnel in Iraq and Syria that began in mid-October have really not influenced the decision of the United States and Iraq to convene this forum.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll go to Fadi Mansour with Al Jazeera.
Q: Thank you for doing this. As every single official here said, that the U.S. forces, coalition forces, are in Iraq, based on the invitation of the Iraqi government, the Iraqi government today, in a statement, clearly signaled that these discussions will address the phased withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq. However, up front, you deny that these discussions will address the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Can you explain to us the disconnect here?
And if the Iraqis insist on raising this issue, will you refrain from discussing the withdrawal of U.S. forces? Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is the senior defense official. Again, the HMC will enable the United States and Iraq to, together, discuss the future of the strong security partnership to advance our shared objectives and interests. And I really don't think we can say more about what that outcome will be, because those discussions are just getting started.
Obviously, it does address an eventual transition for Operation Inherent Resolve, but further than that, I think, would simply be speculative.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll turn it over to Jeff Seldin with VOA.
Q: Thanks very much for doing this. Just wondering, what is the Pentagon's current assessment of the size, strength, capabilities of ISIS in Iraq right now?
And how connected do you see ISIS's operations in Iraq to those in Syria? And how does that impact specifically these discussions?
Do you feel like ISIS is degraded to the point where the — the size of the U.S. presence is — doesn't matter as much, or does it still make a big difference to have the U.S. presence there, with what ISIS is able to do?
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: This is the senior military official. I'll go first with that.
One, having been on the ground with the fight for a while, through our partnered forces and through what they are assessing, you do have a Daesh presence, obviously, still in Syria and in Iraq — not to the level where they're operational, where they can tie their tactical engagements and battles together into an operation, nor can they hold or seize territory, and certainly, strategically, across the globe, not viable — maybe strategically plotting but not capable of controlling large areas or territory.
So if you're looking at numbers, what we're going to say is we assess that the numbers are very, very much around the 1,000 or so in Syria and in Iraq. And that's if you count facilitators, fighters, financiers, the network that would support the Daesh fighters in those locations.
And in both areas, they're not in urban areas. They're disrupted. They're suppressed. They are in complex terrain and mountain environments or in some of the less-governed spaces in the Badiya desert, Syria, or in some of the places in central Iraq around the Kirkuk Saladin province, for example, where the Iraqi security forces are constantly working their intelligence platforms to detect and track these small ISIS cells.
So, again, it's not about numbers; it's about a capability. They're not — Daesh is not capable beyond small attacks, currently in Iraq and Syria, thanks to the great efforts of the Iraqi security forces, who are doing quite well at keeping a handle on the Daesh challenge. Over?
MODERATOR: Thank you. We have time for just a couple more questions. We'll do Phil Stewart with Reuters.
Q: I understand that the termination of the HMC has yet to be finalized, but is it the goal of the Biden administration to maintain a U.S. troop presence in Iraq, long-term?
And then my other question was, if the senior military official could bring us up to date about the number of U.S. wounded in the attacks by militia in Iraq and Syria, to date? Thank you.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is the senior defense official. Well, the United States, and really both nations, remain committed to security cooperation and our shared interests in regional stability. Together we'll work to shape the future U.S. military presence and ensure an Iraqi-led enduring defeat of ISIS. I think that's the most I will say on that.
Regarding the attacks and the casualties, I believe we've stated previously — I'm forgetting if it's two or three U.S. personnel wounded in the most recent attack at —
(UNKNOWN): Al-Asad.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: — at Al-Asad Air Force Base, and one seriously injured Iraqi Security Force service members.
Q: Do you have a total figure?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Total figure? I don't have that.
Q: In all the attacks? Thank you.
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, this is the Senior Military Official. So we've had one very serious injury in all of the attacks since October 18th and we've had 70 injured in various forms, lightly injured, mostly those, to be frank, are from concussive events from rocket, mortar, indirect fire, or one-way UAS attacks with anything from eight to 50 kilograms worth of explosives.
So we're very thankful the casualties have not been severe or more numerous, and the injuries are not necessarily wounds, it's just some of the concussive effects that happened during the blast that happened near their locations on bases. Over.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll turn it over to Lara Seligman with Politico.
Q: Thanks for doing this. I wanted to ask you what has been the impact of these recent attacks and the environment in the Middle East on the discussions? I know you said the timing of the discussions is not related but I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit and characterize what — how this change in the strategic environment is impacting the talks?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is the Senior Defense Official. You know, if anything, the militia attacks delayed our original plan. The HMC was initially a — the commitment to do it was initially announced in August of 2023, the plan was to proceed later in 2023.
Obviously, events in recent weeks have, you know, caused everyone to have to tend to other business. But we're now back to the long-planned and originally planned launch of this HMC, and if anything, we're here despite the militia attacks, not because of them.
So, you know, we're committed to — along with our Iraqi partners, to consistently revisit the question of timing, but we'll ensure as we do that the HMC is this comprehensive, efficient, and professional process.
Q: And just to follow up, you've — you're kind of — everyone keeps talking around the — calling it a transition to normal — a normal bilateral security cooperation relationship and sort of talking around the fact that — what that means is a eventual drawdown of U.S. troops. So can you just clarify that we're — we're understanding this correctly, like, the — the ultimate goal is eventually a drawdown?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Again, the Senior Defense Official. You know, we are going to, together with our Iraqi partners, help determine the shape of the future U.S. military presence in Iraq, and at the same time, ensure an Iraqi-led enduring defeat of ISIS. But beyond that, we won't speculate.
MODERATOR: Thank you. We'll do one last question from Mike Glenn with Washington Times.
Q: No, I'm good, (Pete ?). You can go on to somebody else. My question's been answered.
MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you. Spencer Ackerman with Nation Magazine?
Q: Thanks very much. Can you talk about the impact, notwithstanding your answer just now, of the Iraqi Prime Minister saying that after the drone strike in Baghdad earlier this month, it was time to talk about something closer to a terminal phase of the U.S. military presence in Iraq?
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is Senior Defense Official. I'll refer you to the government of Iraq to address comments made by Iraqi government officials.
The announcements today coordinated between our two governments about the launch of the HMC process describe — and I've repeated it a couple of times — what we intend — how we intend to conduct this process and what we're trying to achieve. So that — I think that's the best way I can answer that question.
MODERATOR: Okay, thank you all for joining us today, and of course, to our briefers. Again, this briefing was on background and all comments should be attributed to a Senior Defense Official, Senior State Official, or a Senior Military Official.
Thank you very much.
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